Western Michigan University

ScholarWorks at WMU
Dissertations

Graduate College

8-2002

Ideology or Insanity? Media Presentation of Ted Kaczynski and
Tim McVeigh
Matthew P. Sheptoski
Western Michigan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations
Part of the Criminology Commons, Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons, and the Social
Psychology and Interaction Commons

Recommended Citation
Sheptoski, Matthew P., "Ideology or Insanity? Media Presentation of Ted Kaczynski and Tim McVeigh"
(2002). Dissertations. 1303.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations/1303

This Dissertation-Open Access is brought to you for free
and open access by the Graduate College at
ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please
contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

IDEOLOGY OR INSANITY? MEDIA PRESENTATION OF
TED KACZYNSKI AND TIM McVEIGH

by
Matthew P. Sheptoski

A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Sociology

Western Michigan University
August 2002

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

IDEOLOGY OR INSANITY? MEDIA PRESENTATION OF TED
KACZYNSKI AND TIM McVEIGH
Matthew P. Sheptoski, PhD
Western Michigan University, 2002

This dissertation explores mainstream media presentation of two
convicted murderers: Theodore J. Kaczynski, otherwise known as ‘T h e Unabomber,”
and Timothy J. McVeigh, found guilty of the 1995 destruction of the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. More specifically, I analyze The New York
Times'%and Time's presentation of these two actors in order to assess whether their
acts were attributed to political and ideological motivation or psychological
abnormality and mental illness. Quantitative and qualitative findings indicate that
Kaczynski’s crimes were more likely to be attributed to psychological abnormality
and mental illness, while McVeigh’s crimes were more likely to be attributed to
political and ideological motivation. This dissertation thus stands at the intersection
of mass media and the medicalization of deviance.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

On the morning of April 19, 1995, a yellow Ryder truck parked in front of the
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. At 9:02 a.m. the four
thousand pound homemade bomb which was in the truck’s storage area detonated.
The massive explosion sheared off a large chunk of the building, killing 168 people,
including 19 children, and injuring 500. What motivated the man, Timothy J.
McVeigh, who was eventually convicted of this act? According to The New York
Times, the Oklahoma City bombing was done “in the service of ideology” (Goodman,
1997). In other words, McVeigh’s acts were attributed to political and ideological
motivation.
Just five days later, on April 24th, a bomb exploded in a Sacramento,
California office, killing timber industry lobbyist Gilbert B. Murray. It was the final
explosion in a string o f mail bombs dating back to 1978, which resulted in three
deaths and 23 injuries. What motivated the man, Theodore J. Kaczynski, better
known as “The Unabomber,” who was eventually convicted of these acts? According
to The New York Times, Kaczynski’s actions were the result of individual
psychological abnormality: he killed due to “an inner psychological need” (Johnston,
1995a). In other words, Kaczynski’s actions were attributed to illness. In contrast to
McVeigh, he was not presented as a politically and ideologically motivated actor.
These cases present an interesting opportunity to compare mainstream mass media
coverage o f Theodore J. Kaczynski and Timothy J. McVeigh, paying special attention

l
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to the media’s use and application of medical terminology. More specifically, these
cases provide an opportunity to wed two distinct lines of inquiry: the mass media
research of Herman and Chomsky (2002) and Conrad and Schneider’s (1980)
concept, medicalization, the process whereby conditions, behaviors, and actions come
to be attributed to illness. In this dissertation, I ground the marriage of these research
lines in empirical data by comparing The New York Times's and Time's presentations
of Theodore J. Kaczynski and Timothy J. McVeigh. This dissertation thus stands at
the intersection o f mass media and medicalization.
Critical awareness and analysis of mass media and the images, frames and
perspectives it presents is important because of the major role the media play in
constructing our consciousness and perceptions of the world. Hall had this to say:
“News media are a major source of cultural production and information. Their
representations o f the social world provide explanations, descriptions and frames for
understanding how and why the world works as it does” (1982, p.35). Simply, the
mass media do not just describe events; they also tell why those events occurred.
They “provide explanations.” This dissertation focuses on how The New York Times,
chosen for analysis because of its status as the most important and influential paper in
the country, and Time, chosen because of its status as the country’s most widely
distributed weekly newsmagazine, explained the actions of Ted Kaczynski and Tim
McVeigh.
The media serve as our prime source of news and information about the
world. In providing explanations of events and playing such a large role in the
construction of our worldview, the mass media serve a social control function, or as

2
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Herman and Chomsky put it, “a propaganda function,” (1988, p. xi), especially “in a
world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest” (1988, p. 1).
Critical analysis and understanding of the mass media is important, to be
sure, but the concept of medicalization is crucial as well. As with the mass media, the
significance of medicalization lies in its social control function. In fact, according to
Conrad and Schneider, medicalization has become the main agent of social control
(1980, p. 17).
To date, however, no systematic research has been undertaken which
considers the intersection of mass media and medicalization. More specifically, no
one has compared media coverage of two individuals, one, Kaczynski, an anarchist,
the other, McVeigh, a rightist, who claimed to commit politically and ideologically
motivated crimes, paying special attention to the media’s use and application of
medical terminology.
My specific empirical aim in this investigation of the intersection of mass
media and medicalization is to assess whether or not mainstream media presentations
displayed a double standard in the use and application of medical terminology as an
explanation of the actions of Ted Kaczynski and Tim McVeigh: To what did the
media attribute the actions of Kaczynski and McVeigh? Were the actions of one
more likely to be attributed to political and ideological motivation? Were the actions
of one more likely to be attributed to psychological abnormality? To answer these
questions I performed quantitative and qualitative content analysis of The New York
Times's and Time's coverage of Theodore J. Kaczynski, otherwise known as the
Unabomber, convicted of sending mail bombs to leading technocrats in a 17-year

3
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anti-technology campaign, killing 3 and injuring 17, and Timothy McVeigh,
convicted o f killing 168 people in the destruction of the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, asking two more specific questions of the data in each
article: First, did the article attribute a political ideology to the actor in question?
Second, did the article define the actor in question as abnormal?

History: The McVeigh and Kaczynski Cases
The short histories that follow were drawn from The New York Times and
Time.

Timothy McVeigh
Bom April 23, 1968 in Lockport, New York, near Buffalo, Timothy McVeigh
grew up in a middle-class neighborhood. After graduating from high school in 1986,
McVeigh briefly attended a local community college before enlisting in the U.S.
Army in May of 1988. After basic training he was stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas, as
part of the Army's 1st Infantry Division.
In January of 1991 he was shipped to the Persian Gulf, eventually seeing
combat action in the Persian Gulf War as a gunner in a Bradley Fighting Vehicle.
But McVeigh left the Persian Gulf for Fort Bragg, North Carolina in February to try
out for the Army's elite Special Forces unit. With very little preparation time, he was
unable to endure a 90-minute march with a 45-pound pack, and withdrew from the
program after two days. Upset by his failure to make the Special Forces, McVeigh

4
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took an early discharge offer from the Army, returning to the Buffalo area in January
1992, where he lived with his father and found work as a security guard.
In February of 1993, six Branch Davidians were killed by Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms agents trying to serve arrest and search warrants at the Branch
Davidian compound near Waco, Texas, as part of an investigation into illegal
possession of Firearms and explosives. Four ATF agents were killed. McVeigh
blamed the Federal Government in general and the ATF in particular, for the deaths,
and saw the incident as evidence that the government had become a threat to
Americans’ freedom. He took action.
In September 1994, McVeigh began assembling explosive material for use in
the bomb that would eventually destroy the Murrah Federal Building. Seven months
later, on April 18, 1995, the bomb was assembled as a mixture of ammonium nitrate,
fuel, and other explosives were placed in the back of the infamous Ryder truck.
The following day, April 19, 1995, around 9 a.m. McVeigh lit the fuses on the
bomb, and parked the Ryder truck outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
downtown Oklahoma City. The massive blast occurred at 9:02 a.m., killing 168
people and injuring hundreds more.
McVeigh fled in a getaway car he had placed several blocks from the building
but was stopped 90 minutes later in Oklahoma by a state trooper for driving without a
license plate. He was found to be carrying a concealed Glock pistol and arrested.
Two days later, on April 21,1995, just prior to a court hearing in which he
could have been released on bail, McVeigh was recognized as a bombing suspect and
held. In a now famous scene, McVeigh, his face expressionless, was taken out of the

5
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Noble County Courthouse by federal agents, who walked him through an angry,
shouting mob and transferred him to Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City, where
he appeared before a federal judge and was charged in the bombing of the Murrah
Federal Building.
In August of 1995, McVeigh was indicted on 11 counts in the bombing. The
First three were for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction to kill people and
destroy federal property. The eight remaining counts were for killing federal law
enforcement agents who were in the building. He was arraigned later that month and
pled not guilty.
On February 20, 1996, the Judge in the case, Richard Matsch, ruled that
McVeigh’s trial would be moved to Denver, Colorado, from Oklahoma City due to
pretrial publicity. Specifically, the judge said that the newspaper and television
reports about the two men had demonized them.
The jury, comprised of seven men and five women, was seated April 22,
1997, and on June 2, 1997, McVeigh was found guilty of all 11 counts of murder,
conspiracy, and use of a weapon of mass destruction. Eleven days later he was
sentenced to die by lethal injection. Shortly thereafter Timothy McVeigh was
transferred to the federal prison in Florence, Colorado, known as Supermax, the
nation's most secure prison. Interestingly, he would eventually share a row of cells
with Ted Kaczynski before his execution in June 2001.
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Theodore J. Kaczvnski
Theodore J. Kaczynski was bom May 22, 1942 to Wanda and Theodore R.
Kaczynski and grew up in Evergreen Park, a working-class suburb of Chicago. After
finishing high school early, the 16-year old Kaczynski went off to Harvard in the fall
of 1958 and graduated in 1962. From Harvard he went on to obtain a master's and
doctorate in math from the University of Michigan. In the fall of 1967 Kaczynski
landed a job teaching mathematics at the University of Califomia-Berkeley. In 1969
he abruptly quit.
Ted and his brother David, who would later contact the FBI after reading the
Unabomber manifesto, bought 1.4 acres of land near Lincoln, Montana in 1971. This
is where Kaczynski later built his 10 x 12-foot cabin, in which he lived with no
electricity or running water.
On May 25, 1978 a bomb exploded at Northwestern University, injuring one.
This was the first in a series of mail bomb explosions, which took place over the next
17 years, ending April 24th, 1995 with the death of a timber industry executive. Over
the years, 23 people were injured and three were killed. The case came to be called
“Unabomb” and the mysterious perpetrator came to be known as the Unabomber
because the early targets were people associated with universities and airlines, though
later targets varied from an advertising executive to the president of a timber industry
company.
The next three bombs went off in Illinois as well: on May 9 1979, one person
was injured when a bomb exploded at Northwestern’s Technology Institute. The next
bomb went off on an American Airlines flight leaving Chicago on November 15,
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1979. Twelve people suffered smoke inhalation and the plane made an emergency
landing at Dulles International Airport. The third bomb went off at the home of an
airline executive on June 10, 1980, resulting in one injury.
The next three bombings took place at universities: at the University of Utah
on October 8, 1981, in which no one was injured; at Vanderbilt University, in
Nashville, Tennessee on May 5, 1982, and at Cory Hall (housing the computer
sciences) at the University of California at Berkeley, July 2, 1982, in which a
professor of electrical engineering and computer science was injured.
The Unabomber struck several times in late 1985. The first incident took
place at the University of California, Berkeley, on May 15, leaving one person
injured. One month later, on June 13th, a bomb was found at the Boeing Company in
Auburn Washington. There were no injuries. The next incident took place
November 15, 1985 in Ann Arbor, Michigan, injuring two. The first fatality in the
Unabom case occurred with the next incident, a bombing that took place outside of a
computer store in Sacramento, December 11, 1985.
On February 20, 1987, the Unabomber was spotted outside a Salt Lake City
computer store. The witness saw a man in a hooded sweatshirt and aviator sunglasses
placing a bomb, and this description served as the basis for a widely distributed and
well-known drawing of the Unabomber. He mailed no bombs over the next six years.
The Unabomber was silent until June 23, 1993, when he struck again in
California, severely injuring a genetics professor by sending a mail bomb to his
home. The following day a bomb exploded at Yale University, severely injuring a
professor and computer scientist.

8
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Also in June 1993, the Unabomber communicated for the first time in a letter
to The New York Times, in which he described himself as an anarchist.
The second Unabom fatality took place December 10, 1994, in North
Caldwell, New Jersey when an advertising executive was killed by a bomb sent to his
home.
On April 20, 1995 Kaczynski sent four letters, including one to The New York
Times and another to Yale University computer science professor David Gelemter, a
victim of a Unbomber attack in 1993. In these letters the Unabomber said he had a
long article that he wanted published in a leading newspaper, at which point he would
stop sending mail bombs.
The final bombing took place on April 25, 1995 in Sacramento, California,
when a timber lobbyist was killed as he opened a mail bomb intended for his
predecessor in the forestry association. The Unabomber sent his 37,000-word
manuscript to both The New York Times and The Washington Post on June 24, 1995.
In accompanying letters, he said that if his full manuscript was published by one of
the newspapers within three months, he would stop his bombing campaign. The
article, titled “Industrial Society and Its Future,” called for a worldwide revolution
against industrialization and technology. Over the course of 232 paragraphs
Kaczynski argued that modem technology had forced humans to live and behave in
ways that were increasingly removed from natural patterns of human behavior,
thereby causing numerous problems, from psychological alienation to environmental
destruction.

9
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Several days later Penthouse owner Bob Guccione received a copy of the
manuscript and a letter from Kaczynski in which he said that he wanted the
manuscript published by a leading periodical but would accept publication in
Penthouse if The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Time magazine refused.
A condition, however, was added: if the manuscript was published in Penthouse only,
then one final bomb would be sent.
The Washington Post and The New York Times, after consultation with the
Attorney General and the FBI, split the costs of publishing the "Industrial Society and
Its Future," and on September 19, 1995, The Washington Post published the full
manuscript.
In February 1996, Kaczynski’s younger brother, David, having read the article
and noted similarities between it and old letters written by his brother, contacted the
FBI.
Shortly thereafter, on April 3, 1996, Ted Kaczynski was arrested at his
mountain cabin in Montana and indicted in Sacramento, California for two murders
and two other non-lethal attacks as well as the third fatality, which occurred in New
Jersey.
Opening statements in the trial of Ted Kaczynski, scheduled for January 1998,
were delayed when Kaczynski renewed his request to fire his lawyers and hire an
attorney willing to construct a defense based on his political views. The attorney,
Tony Serra of San Francisco, had agreed to represent Kaczynski for free, but the
judge denied Kaczynski’s request, forcing him to stick with his court-appointed

to
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lawyers, who, the judge ruled previously, had the authority to determine which type
of defense would be used.
Opening statements were again delayed on January 8, 1998, as Kaczynski
asked to serve as his own attorney, whereupon Judge Burrell ordered Kaczynski to
undergo a competency evaluation. It also became known that Kaczynski attempted
suicide the previous night.
On January 17, 1998 court-appointed psychiatrist Dr. Sally Johnson of the
Bureau of Prisons reported that Kaczynski was a paranoid schizophrenic, but
competent to stand trial.
Five days later, on January 22, 1998, Judge Burrell again rejected
Kaczynski’s request to act as his own attorney. Significantly, at this point a deal was
struck and Kaczynski agreed to a plea bargain: in exchange for a guilty plea he was
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, thus avoiding the death
penalty.
In this introductory chapter I have identified the topic under consideration in
this dissertation as well as its significance, posed specific questions for empirical
inquiry, and presented short histories of the McVeigh and Kaczynski cases. In the
chapters that follow I: (1) discuss the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation;
(2) outline the methods used in addressing my research questions; (3) detail both
quantitative and qualitative findings; and (4) interpret and discuss these findings.
I turn now to the theoretical orientation employed in this project.
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CHAPTER II: THEORY

Having introduced my research topic and its general significance, as well as
specifying the research questions under consideration, I turn now to an explication of
the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation, which draws together two distinct
lines of research: Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model of news and Conrad and
Schneider’s notion of the medicalization of deviance.

Herman and Chomsky
First, Herman and Chomsky specify a set of structural factors, which they
term filters, that account for the content and contour of corporate news media in U.S.
(2002, p.35). Grounding their theoretical analysis in both quantitative and qualitative
data from several case studies, they demonstrate how information, viewpoints, and
perspectives which run counter to the interests of corporate and government elites are
systematically filtered out, resulting in a portrayal of the world “as powerful groups
wish it to be perceived (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, preface),” thus serving a
propaganda or social control function in the process. The authors’ account for this
constriction with reference to the filters, which include ownership, advertising, media
sourcing, “flak,” and “the ruling ideology.” The result is elite domination of the mass
media as well as the marginalization of dissent. According to Herman (1996):
These factors are linked together, reflecting the multi-leveled
capability o f powerful business and government entities...to exert
power over the flow of information. We noted that the five factors

12
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involved: ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak, and anti-communist
ideology, work as filters through which information must pass, and
that individually and often in additive fashion they help shape media
choices, (p. 118)

Far more germane to this dissertation, however, is their idea of “dichotomous”
media coverage. Centering on several case studies, they “examine the differences in
treatment of situations broadly similar in character, except for the political and
economic interests at stake. Our expectation is that news as well as editorial opinion
will be strongly influenced by those interests and should display a predictable bias”
(Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p. xix). More simply, the media are expected to treat
similar cases in a dichotomous matter depending on their relation to vested power
interests.
The authors first predict that the victims of nations which are looked upon
unfavorably by the United States will be found “worthy” and will be subject to more
intense and sympathetic coverage than those victimized by the United States or its
“client states,” who are “unworthy” ( Herman & Chomsky, 2002, pp. xix-xx). They
then compare the media’s treatment of victims of enemy states and those of the
United States and its “client states.” Specifically, they compare the treatment by the
media of the murder o f a Polish priest, Jerzy Popieluszko, with victims of American
“client states” in Central America. Their predictions are realized: quantitative and
qualitative analysis reveals “worthy victims” and “unworthy victims,” depending
upon their relationship to elite interests. Media coverage is extensive and
sympathetic for the former, while coverage of the latter is scant and unsympathetic, if,
in fact, they receive any coverage at all. Media treatment of Popieluszko, defined as a

13
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“worthy victim,” was voluminous and sympathetic. Coverage of murdered priests,
nuns, and other victims in Central America, defined as “unworthy victims,” was scant
and much less sympathetic.
Next, they show that the mainstream media have followed a government
agenda in covering elections in “client and disfavored states” (Herman & Chomsky,
2002, p. xxiv). Specifically, they analyze media coverage of elections in Guatemala,
El Salvador, and Nicaragua during the 1980s. Again, their findings reveal
dichotomization: For example, The New York Times coverage of the Nicaraguan
election planned for 1984 focused on such issues as freedom of the press, free speech,
and freedom of assembly, whereas The Times's coverage of the election in El
Salvador the same year made almost no mention of these freedoms, or lack thereof.
The shape and contour of media coverage was expected: Nicaragua was defined as an
“enemy state,” whereas El Salvador was a “client state” of the U.S., clearly and
forcefully demonstrating that the media displayed a double standard in its coverage.
They note:
This same bias is apparent in the press treatment of more recent
elections in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Kenya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey
and Uruguay. Cambodia and Yugoslavia were the only two of these
seven ruled by a party strongly objectionable to us policy makers, and
it is in these cases that The New York Times warns of serious
problems...(Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p. xxv)

In the other countries “deeply flawed” elections were portrayed “as steps
toward democracy.”
The concept of dichotomous media treatment also applied to the alleged
Bulgarian KGB “plot” to murder the pope in the early 1980’s (Herman &Chomsky,

14
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2002, p. 39), as well as “the Indochina wars”; that is, United States aggression against
Cambodia, Lao, and Vietnam (2002, p. xxix).
As their initial case study comparing the mass media’s amount and quality of
coverage devoted to Jerzy Popieluszko, a Polish priest murdered by the Polish police
in October 1984, versus their coverage of priests, nuns, and other religious workers
murdered within U.S. “client states” centers on the coverage of individuals, it most
closely, though by no means fully, parallels this research project. As such, a deeper
consideration of this case is warranted. According to the authors:
A propaganda system will consistently portray people abused in
enemy states as worthy victims, whereas those treated with equal or
greater severity by its own government or clients will be unworthy.
The evidence of worth may be read from the extent and character of
attention and indignation. We will show in this chapter...the US mass
media’s practical definitions of worth...(Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p.
37)

The authors expect Popieluszko, murdered in an enemy state, will be defined
by the media as a “worthy victim,” whereas priests murdered in our client states in
Latin America will be defined as “unworthy victims”: ‘T h e former may be expected
to elicit a propaganda outburst by the mass media; the latter will not generate
sustained coverage” (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p. 37).
Coverage of Popieluszko’s murder and the trial of his murderers by The New
York Times, Time, Newsweek, and CBS News was compared to media coverage of (I)
seventy two murdered priests, as listed in the book Cry o f the People, by Penny
Lemoux, in Latin America by agents o f U.S. “client states”; (2) 23 priests,
missionaries, and other religious workers murdered in Guatemala from 1980-1985;

15
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(3) the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador, murdered in 1980; and
(4) four American nuns murdered in El Salvador, also in 1980.
The total coverage of those murdered in U.S. client states did not equal that
devoted to Popieluszko: a total of 57 articles appeared in The New York Times (still
26.9% fewer articles than were devoted to Popieluszko). There were a total of 604.5
column inches (48.9% less than Popieluszko). The Times ran eight front-page article
(20% fewer than Popieluszko) and no editorials. A total of ten articles were
published in Time and Newsweek (37.5% less than Popieluszko), with 247.5 column
inches (20.9% less than Popieluszko). CBS Evening News aired 16 pieces (30.4%
less than Popieluszko).
In addition to these quantitative differences, which are obviously very large,
Herman and Chomsky performed qualitative analysis, asking such questions as: Were
the murders portrayed as outrageous acts of barbarity or treated as unfortunate
outcomes in troubled regions? Did the stories contain demands for justice? Was
there speculation as to the possible involvement of authorities? Were the details of the
murder told in full and reiterated in story after story? The authors state, for example:
“With Popieluszko the media tried hard to establish that there was knowledge of and
responsibility for the crime at higher levels of the Polish government. Soviet interest
and possible involvement were also regularly invoked. With Romero, in contrast, no
such questions were raised or pressed” (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p. 54).
And while the media described the murder of Popieluszko in great detail, the
details of Romero’s murder were “concise” (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p. 48). Of
the murdered churchwomen, they say:

16
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Gruesome details of Popieluszko were recounted extensively while in
all four of the media institutions in our sample the accounts of the
violence done to the four murdered women were very succinct,
omitted many details and were not repeated after the initial
disclosures. The murder of the four churchwomen was made remote
and impersonal. (2002, p. 61)

They conclude:
W e...show that the quality of treatment of the worthy and unworthy
victims also differed sharply. While the coverage of the worthy victim
was generous with gory details and quoted expressions of outrage and
demands for justice, the coverage of the unworthy victims was lowkeyed, designed to keep the lid on emotions and evoking regretful and
philosophical generalities on the omnipresence of violence and the
inherent tragedy of human life. (2002, p.39)

Each of the case studies analyzed by Herman and Chomsky dealt with media
coverage of international events. How do their analyses bear out when applied to
domestic events? Though they have not provided the in-depth and systematic
quantitative and qualitative evidence as they have for coverage of Popieluszko and
the murdered priests, for example, they say their ideas can be fruitfully applied to the
domestic scene, explaining well media presentation of: Jesse Jackson’s 1988
presidential campaign (McChesney, 1989, p. 39), NAFTA (Herman & Chomsky,
2002, p. xliii) and labor issues (2002, xiv), the chemical industry and its regulation or
lack thereof (2002, p.xlvi), the “health insurance controversy” of 1992-93 (2002, p.
xlviii), the “drug wars” (2002, p.xlviii), and the Seattle and Washington, D.C.
protests of 1999 and 2000 (2002, p. xliii).
Herman and Chomsky have not, however, applied their model to comparative
coverage o f two individuals who claim to have committed politically motivated

17

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

crimes but who represent opposing ideologies, one left and one right. Nor have other
authors.
I tum now to the concept of medicalization.

Medicalization
What is the medicalization of deviance? The medicalization o f deviance can
be most simply characterized as the process whereby problems, behaviors, or social
conditions come to be defined as caused by disease or illness; that is, they are defined
as medical problems. The medical model assumes that the problem, behavior, or
condition in question is caused by illness and this assumption impacts society’s
understanding of and response to the behavior, condition, or problem. According to
Conrad: ’T h e key to medicalization is the definitional issue. Medicalization consists
of defining a problem in medical terms, using medical language to describe a
problem,” and “adopting a medical framework to understand a problem ...” (1992,
p.211). The “definitional issue” is an important one, as a variety of labels are usually
culturally available. That is, a particular action, problem, or condition may be
defined as being caused by sin, badness, or illness, as is increasingly the case in
modem society. According to Szasz, medicalization of the personal, the social and
the political are “pervasive characteristic of the modem age” (1970, p.5).
The point is that various labels are available for describing and defining acts,
behaviors, and problems. For example, did political motivation, mental illness, or the
devil cause the acts for which McVeigh and Kaczynski were convicted? Under the
medicalization of deviance, acts are said to be caused by illness. Conceiving of
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deviant behavior as caused by illness leads to emphasis, stress, and focus on that
which is internal to social actors, while de-emphasizing the external environment. In
so doing, “ ...the medical model of deviance locates the source of deviant behavior
within the individual” (Conrad & Schneider, 1980, p. 35).
Conrad (1992) has identified three levels on which medicalization can occur.
First, it can take place on the conceptual level, wherein a medical vocabulary or
model is used to define and make sense of the problem, condition, or act in question.
When medicalization occurs on this level, medical professionals may be only
marginally involved and medical treatments may not be used (p. 211). This level of
medicalization is most applicable to the present research, in which The New York
Times and Time were more likely to use a medical vocabulary to define and describe
Kaczynski than McVeigh and medical professionals such as psychiatrists were
marginally involved.
The two other levels, the institutional and intersectional, though not germane
to my research, deserve mention. On the institutional level, medicalization takes
place when organizations use a medical approach. It is on the interactional level that
“physicians are most directly involved. Medicalization occurs here as part of doctorpatient interaction, when a physician defines a problem as medical.”
Conditions from child abuse (Pfohl, 1977), to alcoholism (Schneider, 1978)
have been medicalized. Work has also been done on the “medicalization of women’s
lives”: battering, obesity, anorexia, and bulimia have been analyzed in terms of
medicalization (Conrad, 1992, p. 221). Conrad has also identified work on the
medicalization o f aging (p. 222).
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The typical focus in medicalization research has been “on the production of
definitions, their use, and the consequences of that use” (Conrad & Schneider, 1992,
p.278). In other work from the same year Conrad laid out areas o f future research. It
is clear that mass media use of medical vocabulary and definitions to depoliticize
behavior was not on the agenda (Conrad, 1992). Nor have other researchers
identified and analyzed these important issues since, though work continues to utilize
the concept of medicalization.
I now take a very brief look at several recent projects which have taken
medicalization as their focus, but which do not look at mass media and
depoliticization. First, Carpiano (2001) says that Viagra has created a new model of
medicalization, “passive medicalization, ” in which demand for the medication
caused the medical industry to act as opposed to the oft-assumed “medical
imperialism,” whereby the medical industry and professions seek to widen the scope
of their field (p. 444). Instead of medical professionals medicalizing a condition,
erectile dysfunction, he claims the public has claimed the medical label. Likewise,
the Kaczynski case does not display “medical imperialism”.
Steen (2001) identified the medicalization of juvenile sex offenders in one
Washington State county, emphasizing the conflicts which arise from competing legal
and medical definitions which operate within the county’s juvenile justice system.
Her work highlights the socially constructed nature and politics of the medicalization
of deviance. With regard to media coverage of Kaczynski especially, but McVeigh as
well, competing definitions were of obvious concern, again pointing to “the politics
of definition” (Conrad and Schneider, 1980).
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Rossol (2001) used Conrad’s work on medicalization to show how members
of the twelve-step program Gambler’s Anonymous, in attending group meetings and
interacting with other “compulsive gamblers,” come to adopt a medical vocabulary
and medical model to understanding and explain their behavior. He focused on how
nonmedical laypersons in a non-medical setting adopt a medical vocabulary (Rossol,
2001, p. 318). The application of medical definitions in the absence of medical
personnel typifies both Rossol’s work on Gambler’s Anonymous as well as the
present research, but, to date, there is little note in the medicalization literature on the
role of the mass media in medicalization which takes place on a conceptual level.
That is, little attention is paid to mass media’s use and application of medical
definitions, particularly when those labels or definitions are applied to an act which is
specifically claimed to be political, though several authors have noted the use of
medical labels to depoliticize what would seem to be obviously political actions or
behaviors. In the following paragraphs I briefly identify such work.
Several authors have noted the use of mental illness labels to depoliticize, and
thus neutralize, political opponents or critics. Such practice has a rather long history.
According to Bloch and Reddaway, the first recorded instance in which psychiatric
means were used to depoliticize dissent in Russia occurred in 1836, when philosopher
Pyotr Chaadayev wrote a “philosophical letter” critical of Nicholas I, who then
declared him officially insane (1985, p. 133).
Conrad and Schneider cite the use in the United States of the medical label
“draptomania,” which was said to be a disease that caused slaves to run away from
their masters (1980, p. 35). Nazi leaders defined their political opponents as mentally
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ill before ordering their death, with political dissidents and racial minorities labeled
“inveterate German haters” (1980, p. 223).
Medicalization results in the depoliticization of deviant behavior. Probably
the most widely known instances of depoliticization of deviant behavior took place
when political dissenters in the Soviet Union were labeled mentally ill and
institutionalized. ‘T h is strategy served to neutralize the meaning of political protest
and dissent, rendering it the ravings of mad persons” (Conrad, 1987, p.67).
The most in-depth analysis of the depoliticization of Soviet dissidents comes
from Bloch and Reddaway (1977,1985). Systematic hospitalization of dissenters did
not begin until the late 1930’s under Stalin, continuing through the 1960’s (Bloch &
Reddaway, 1985, p. 138), with 500 documented cases over the past two decades
(1985, p. 141). It is worth pointing out that schizophrenia was the medical label most
often applied to Soviet dissidents (Bloch & Reddaway, 1985, p. 142), and was one of
the labels applied to Ted Kaczynski.
Bloch and Reddaway focus on the state and its use of psychiatry to
depoliticize: “For instance, the state may interpret a person’s intentions and actions in
such a way as to undermine the legitimacy of the individual’s political dissent.
Manipulated in this manner, political protest turns into a psychiatric issue” (1985, p.
130). They continue: “The state, with the aid of psychiatrists, can thus discredit and
effectively silence people who oppose its policies” (Bloch & Reddaway, 1985, p.
130). In the case of Soviet dissidents, the state had the power to apply medical labels
as a way of neutralizing political protest.
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Though Conrad and Bloch and Reddaway identify the use of medical labels as
a tool used to control political opponents and dissent, the possible or potential role of
the mass media in such processes is not mentioned. Several authors working in the
specific area o f the medicalization o f deviance have at least mentioned the role of the
media in these processes, though just one has mentioned the role media might play in
the medicalization and depoliticization o f political protest and dissent.
Authors have noted the rise of medicine and the medical label as a mechanism
of social control, but to date little research has paid attention to the intersection of the
media and medicalization with regard to depoliticization, though several researchers
have at least mentioned the role of the media in medicalization processes.
Conrad and Schneider, for example, note that while the criminal justice
system is typically understood to be the main institution and agent of social control,
the mass media serve this function as well through the influencing of public
perception and the social construction of reality (Conrad & Schneider, p. 1980). But
they do not pursue this line of inquiry.
In his work on Viagra and the passive medicalization of erectile dysfunction
Carpiano says that “news programs and newspaper articles” were “arguably” more
responsible in promoting the medicalization of erectile dysfunction than the
pharmaceutical industry (2001, p. 447). Yet he does not pursue this line or provide
any evidence to support this claim.
Tiefer (1994) has analyzed the role of the mass media in one case of
medicalization, the medicalization of impotence, in which the mass media served as
one of four claims makers who promoted the medicalization o f impotence. More
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specifically, she looked at the media’s role in defining for the public what constitutes
an acceptable body, what it means to “function” properly, and the media’s role in
getting people to accept, adopt, and internalize medicalized definitions. The use of
medicalized language by the mass media is instrumental to these processes.
According to Tiefer (1994, p. 268), the mass media promote a medicalized
definition of sexual processes and impotence because it enables them to present
sexual and titillating material legitimately and without protest. This raises the issue
of economic concerns and interests merging with the mass media and the
medicalization of deviance: medicalized definitions serve the interests of commercial
media organizations in that they are more openly able to discuss and portray sex in an
ultimate effort to sell more products.
Interestingly enough, one person who has acknowledged, however briefly, the
mass media’s role in the medicalization and depoliticization of individuals is
psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, who, writing in 1970, noted Time magazine’s coverage of
Ezra Pound, indicted for treason at the end of WWII and committed to a psychiatric
institution for 13 years. Upon his release from prison, Time printed a picture of
Pound with the caption “Freedom for the warped” (Szasz, 1970, p. 207). Speaking
more generally, he had this to say: “ .. .not only the psychiatric and allied
professions, the newspapers...are imbued with and purvey the ideology of mental
health and illness” (Szasz, 1970, p. 75).
In this chapter, I have identified and explored the theoretical underpinnings of
this dissertation, focusing on the critical mass media research perspective put forth by
Herman and Chomsky as well as Conrad and Schneider’s concept of medicalization.
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More specifically, Herman and Chomsky provide quantitative and qualitative
evidence of media distortion and uneven coverage. The strength of their analysis lies
in the notion of “dichotomous” media coverage, whereby otherwise similar cases are
presented differently based on their relation to vested power interests. They have not,
however, discussed or even identified the uneven use and application of medical
terminology by the mass media. On the other hand, Conrad and Schneider
specifically, and the medicalization literature generally, have identified and discussed
the use and application of medical terminology and labels to depoliticize behavior or
actions, but very little research has identified or discussed the mass media’s role in
this process. My research draws together two distinct lines of research, wedding
Herman and Chomsky’s idea of “dichotomous coverage” to mass media use and
application of medical terminology, leading me to an investigation of the media's
uneven application of medical labels. This dissertation thus stands at the intersection
of mass media and the medicalization of deviance.
In the following chapter I detail the methodological tools employed in this
dissertation.
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CHAPTER ffl: METHODS

Introduction
Having addressed the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation, I now
describe and discuss the methods employed in this dissertation. First, I briefly explain
why I compared the Kaczynski and McVeigh cases. Second, I address mass media
research methods, defining content analysis and laying out my rationale for using it in
this dissertation. Third, I explain why I chose The New York Times and Time as
sources of data. This includes a description of how I acquired the documents for
analysis in this dissertation. Fourth, I specify and discuss the specific steps involved
in the recording of data from articles. More specifically, I detail the protocol
categories used in the recording of data as well as my rationale in doing so. I then
turn to the operational definitions used in this dissertation: How were “ideology” and
“normalcy” to be measured? Finally, I briefly discuss the system of enumeration used
in this dissertation. Throughout this chapter I identify, describe, and discuss the
issues and problems with which I dealt, as well as my rationale in doing so.

Why Kaczynski and McVeigh? Why Two Cases?
I chose to compare media presentations of Kaczynski and McVeigh for three
reasons. First, both actors claimed to have committed acts of politically and
ideologically motivated violence, but did so in the name of different ideologies:
Kaczynski attributed his actions to anarchist ideology, while McVeigh attributed his
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actions to rightist ideology. Second, the cases, both of which received heavy media
coverage, occurred along a roughly similar timeline: though Kaczynski began sending
mail bombs in 1978, the case did not come to prominence until 1995. In fact, the first
New York Times article on Kaczynski appeared just five days after the Oklahoma City
Bombing, which took place on April 19, 1995. Kaczynski and McVeigh were in the
news for roughly the next two years. Third, as my work draws on Herman and
Chomsky’s idea that events and actors which are otherwise broadly similar will be
presented differently by the media depending on their political ideology, the
comparison of two cases was most appropriate.

Content Analysis
The most basic issue one faces in carrying out mass media research is which
research method to use. Each carries with it advantages and disadvantages, strengths
and weaknesses, but the chosen method must enable the researcher to answer his or
her research questions (Homig-Priest, 1996). According to Williams, Rice, and
Rogers, the question: “Which research design or methodological approach should be
used, should be re-phrased, to read: Which methods are appropriate for which types
of questions?” (1988, p. 34). They continue: “ .. .we think this conflict (over research
methods) is often taken to an extreme, as no research method is the most appropriate
for all research problems. Each has different advantages, disadvantages, assumptions,
biases, and degrees of usefulness” (Williams et al, 1988, p. 34).
If the research questions center on media institutions and organizations
qualitative methods may be most appropriate. If one wishes to study the daily
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operations of a media organization, CBS, for example, participant observation is an
appropriate method (Homig-Priest, 1996, p. 103). The main issue here revolves
around access: how is it to be obtained? It is much easier for someone such as
Herbert Gans, who has a background in journalism and contacts in the business, to
gain access. O f course the issue of access is relevant in all research involving
participant observation, so gaining long-term access to mass media audiences will
also be an issue. Archival research and secondary data analysis may also be
appropriate ways of researching media institutions and organizations.
If the research questions center on the content of media text, as mine do, then
content analysis, defined by Homig-Priest as “the systematic description of the
content of some part of the mass media” (1988, p. 66), is the most appropriate
methodology: “Where media content itself is the object of study, content analysiswhether quantitative or qualitative— is the logical choice” (Homig-Priest, 1996,
p.82).
There has been considerable debate in the social sciences in regard to whether
or not content analysis must be quantitative. Holsti, writing in 1969, said the
following, which today is widely accepted: “Our definition does not include any
reference to quantification because a rigid qualitative-quantitative distinction seems
unwarranted for the purposes of defining the technique” (p. 14).
When possible, however, media researchers should use multiple methods, or
triangulation, whether asking questions of organization and institution, text, or
audience. Williams, Rice, and Rogers state: “As for methodology, we take the
position that the...m edia researcher should understand and take advantage of
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alternative research designs, including use where appropriate of multiple research
methods or ‘triangulation.’”(1988, p. 13). They continue: ‘T h e logic for triangulation
is that the weaknesses of any single method, qualitative or quantitative, are balanced
by the strengths of the other method” (Williams et al, 1988, p.47).
Content analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, was used in this
dissertation because it was the most appropriate method to answer my research
questions. Research questions focusing on media content are best answered by
studying media content, hence the use of content analysis, about which Homig-Priest
says: “where media content itself is the object of study, content analysis— whether
quantitative or more qualitative— is the logical choice” (1996, p. 83).
She continues:
.. .you can’t answer questions about media content by asking people—
you answer them by looking at content. Conversely, you can’t answer
questions about how people think or feel or how they are influenced by
looking only at content— you need to have data from people, (p. 83)

The New York Times and Time: Why?
Two leading national publications were examined in this dissertation, one
daily and one weekly. Analysis of The New York Times and Time was based on
theoretical and practical considerations. As a daily “paper of record”, The New York
Times is well respected and believed to be a leading forum for the formulation of elite
opinion. What The New York Times says carries weight. According to Merrill, it is
“a national and world leader in the area of journalism” and “principal newspaper of
record in the United States” (1983, p. 310).
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The choice of a weekly newsmagazine came down to three possibilities: Time,
Newsweek, or US News and World Report. I chose Time for a simple reason: with a
circulation of almost four million it is the most widely distributed of the three
publications, with almost double the circulation of US News and World Report and a
million more than Newsweek (“U.S. News names,” 2001)
On a more practical level, print media generally, and The New York Times and
Time specifically, were analyzed for reasons of convenience. Obtaining either radio
or television broadcasts dating back to 1995 would have been difficult, time
consuming and expensive. On the other hand, print media sources, especially popular
mainstream sources such as The New York Times and Time were readily available.
Using Lexxus-Nexxus and Infotrac, I was able to access and print all articles from the
comfort of my apartment. Researchers performing content analyses of television
news, newspapers and magazines all face the issue of access to documents. Indeed,
one cannot perform content analyses, qualitative or quantitative, without a sufficient
number of documents (Homig-Priest, 1996, p. 80).
Using the advanced search option on Lexxus Nexxus I searched for all articles
in The New York Times that contained the keywords ‘T e d Kaczynski,” “Unabomber,”
and ‘Tim othy McVeigh.” For purposes of analysis I included only articles of 250
words or more, beginning with the first mention of either Kaczynski, Unabomber, or
McVeigh, and ending with the judge’s sentencing of Kaczynski and with the jury’s
sentence of death for McVeigh. For Kaczynski this encompassed 132 articles. The
New York Times published 314 articles on McVeigh, which met these parameters.
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Curiously, though The New York Times and many other daily and weekly
publications were in the Lexxus-Nexxus database, Time magazine was not. I was
able to access Time's articles on Kaczynski and McVeigh through Infotrac. Again,
using the same keywords and including articles from the first mention of their names
through their sentencing I found 26 articles on Kaczynski and 29 articles on
McVeigh. The Kaczynski articles ran from December 12, 1994 to May 18, 1998,
while coverage of McVeigh ran from May I, 1995 to June 23, 1997.

Data Collection
Protocol
My next task was to devise a plan to gather/collect information from these 501
articles, which would allow me to answer my research questions. Specifically, which
data were to be collected and recorded from these documents? I needed to devise a
research protocol, which “is a way to ask questions of a document. It is a list of
questions, items, categories, or variables that guide data collection from documents”
(Altheide, 1996, p.26).
Following the tenets of qualitative content analysis, I did not yet know which
information I would record. To get a feel for the content of these documents and to
decide which information was germane to my research questions and interests I read
The New York Times's first twenty-five articles on Kaczynski and McVeigh and
Time's first ten articles on each. Then I constructed a protocol, based on those
outlined by Altheide (1996, p. 28), that guided my data collection. The following
information was recorded for each article: first, the date and complete headline as
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well as, for The New York Times articles, the section of the paper in which the article
appeared, including whether or not it was an editorial. For the Time articles I noted
whether or not the article was a cover story. The remaining three protocol columns
were used to record category data.
A brief explication of the principles of category construction follows. First,
categories must enable the researcher to answer his or her questions. Accordingly,
they will vary according to the researcher’s questions. If the researcher wants to
know whether acts or events were attributed to ideology or psychological abnormality
he or she must have a category which allows for the recording of this attribute or
characteristic. Were I only interested in whether or not the acts of Kaczynski and
McVeigh were attributed to abnormality there would have been no reason to include
the category o f “ideology.” The categories used in a particular content analysis must
reflect the research questions. As such, there are no specific categories a researcher
must include.
Categories must also be mutually exclusive. According to Holsti: ‘T he
requirement of mutual exclusiveness stipulates that no content datum can be placed in
more than a single cell. That is, categories must be specific and distinct so that any
single piece of data can only be placed in one category” (1969, p.99). The category
“ideology” was operationally defined as single words, essentially reducing my task to
a clerical one. The category of “abnormal”, though more difficult to operationally
define, was so distinct from “ideology” that there was little chance of a content item
being placed in more than one category.
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Categories must also be exhaustive. That is, there must be a category into
which each relevant recording unit or unit of analysis can be placed (Nachmias &
Nachmias, 1992, p. 315). Finally, categories, and by extension, operational
definitions, should be distinct and precise enough that replication of the research is
possible. In other words, if other researchers follow the format the project should
yield consistent results.
The process of protocol, and more specifically, category construction, must be
done with care and thought, for category construction is the most important aspect in
content analysis (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992, p. 314).
Bearing this in mind and using the guidelines outlined above, I decided to use
two categories: my protocol contained columns to record whether or not the article
defined either Kaczynski or McVeigh as “abnormal,” and whether or not a political
“ideology” was attributed to the actor in question. These categories, “abnormal” and
“ideology”, emerged from the data during my initial reading o f the first twenty five
New York Times articles on Kaczynski and McVeigh and the first ten articles on each
in Time.
For each of the 501 articles I recorded whether or not a particular attribute was
present or absent. If, for example, Kaczynski was defined as “abnormal” in an article
I wrote “yes” in the “abnormal” column and then recorded, in the same column, the
word or words which were used to define him as such. On November 6, 1995, The
New York Times ran an article with the headline “Bomber is Called Killer Who is Not
on a Political Mission” (Johnston) in which Kaczynski was defined as abnormal.
Written in the appropriate column is “yes,” followed by the word or phrase used to
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define him as abnormal: “serial murderer who kills to satisfy an inner psychological
need.”
Though Altheide covers the main information that is generally included in the
protocol, there is no single protocol format which is appropriate for all content
analyses, just as there are no set categories a researcher must use. The test of a
protocol lies in whether it enables the researcher to record all the information
necessary to adequately address the research questions. The researcher must ask
whether the necessary information can be obtained from the articles using the
protocol at hand (Altheide, 1996, p. 7). If not, the protocol must be revised.

Operational Definitions
Having settled on the categories of “abnormal” and “ideology,” my next task
was to code the data. I needed to devise a set of indicators that determined whether or
not an attribute was present and into which category it fell (Nachmias & Nachmias,
1992, p. 315). How would I measure the concepts “abnormal” and “ideology”?
What would count? In other words, operational definitions had to be constructed.
Constructing operational definitions for the category “ideology” was relatively
simple. After reading the first twenty-five New York Times articles on Kaczynski and
McVeigh I constructed word lists of terms identifying the concept (Holsti, 1969, p.
95). I had to measure whether or not articles identified a political ideology with each
of these men. If an article on Kaczynski contained one of the following words, the
article, for purposes of coding was defined as having attributed to him a political
ideology: “anarchist,” “environmentalist,” and “left”. Variations of the first two
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words were accepted as well. For example, “anarchism” and “environmentalism”
counted. These words were used for several reasons. First, Kaczynski specifically
identified himself as an anarchist in several letters to the New York Times as well as in
his article, “Industrial Society and its Future.” As for environmentalist/ism,
Kaczynski said in his writings that clues to his thinking and position could be found
in the “radical environmentalist journals.” Finally, though “Industrial Society and its
Future” specifically criticized “leftists,” he was labeled a leftist in several articles and
was associated with the campus turmoil of the sixties, having been a student at both
the University of Michigan and the University of Califomia-Berkeley during the
sixties.
However, I used these words as operational definitions because they were in
the articles: that is, my operational definitions were not constructed beforehand and
then applied to the data. Instead, following the reflexive approach espoused by
methods scholars such as Holsti (1969), as well as more recent writers such as
Altheide (1996), I first read a portion of the documents in order to get a feel for the
material. In other words, the operational definitions emerged from the data rather
than being pre-conceived. As with the categories I ultimately settled on, how was I to
know, before reading a portion of the documents, if the operational definitions were
appropriate?
The following words were used as operational definitions in assessing whether
or not a political ideology was attributed to McVeigh: “right,” or, as with Kaczynski,
a variation o f this word, such as “right-wing” or “rightist.” Second, I looked for the
word “patriot.” Third, I looked for the word “militia.” If any one of these words
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appeared in an article on McVeigh it was coded in my protocol as attributing to
McVeigh a political ideology. Because the operational definitions for the category
“ideology” were so straightforward, my coding task was essentially reduced to
clerical work.
Finally, and most importantly for this dissertation, I had to operationalize
“abnormal.” Again, rather than hoping the data fit my operational definitions, my
operational definitions emerged from the documents. Rather than having a pre
defined list of terms for which I was looking and which would be used to measure the
presence of this attribute, I read each article, and if either Kaczynski or McVeigh
seemed to be defined as abnormal I wrote the word or words which were used in the
description in that article’s slot in the protocol. A complete list of all terms, which
were counted as defining either Kaczynski or McVeigh as abnormal, appears in the
Appendix.

Enumeration
Finally, I had to decide how to count the presence of these attributes. In other
words, I needed to decide upon a system of enumeration, the two main possibilities
being frequency and appearance (Holsti, 1969, p.121). W ould I tally the frequency
with which an attribute appeared within an article or would I simply count whether or
not the attribute was present in the particular article? For example, on May 7, 1995,
The New York Times ran an article on Kaczynski under the headline “Prominent
Anarchist Finds Unsought Ally In Serial Bomber,” in which the word “anarchist”
appeared ten times. When coding this article was I to count “anarchist” as having
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appeared ten times or was I to count the attribute as simply present within the article?
Because my interest lay in finding the percentage of articles in which the attributes of
interest appeared, I simply counted whether an attribute was present within a given
article. This system of enumeration is known as “contingency analysis,“ “in which the
coding of material depends on the absence or presence of the attribute within the
document o r section of the document, rather than on the frequency of its presence.
(Holsti, 1969, p 7). A frequency count, though the most widely used system of
enumeration in content analysis (Holsti, 1969, p. 122), would not yield data
appropriate to my research.
In this chapter I have identified and discussed the methodological approach
employed in this dissertation. I turn now to the findings of my quantitative and
qualitative content analyses of media presentations of Ted Kaczynski and Tim
McVeigh.
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CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS

In the previous chapter I have laid out the methods utilized in this dissertation.
In this chapter I address my Findings. First, I offer a simple presentation and
interpretation of the quantitative data culled from The New York Times and Time.
Second, I turn to qualitative analysis of The New York Times's and Time's coverage
of Kaczynski and McVeigh. First, I analyze media presentation of Kaczynski with
regard to “Abnormality.” I then do the same with regard to McVeigh. Third, I
analyze media presentation o f Kaczynski with regard to “Ideology.” I then do the
same with regard to McVeigh. I now turn to my quantitative findings.

Quantitative Findings
Table 1 indicates the following. In each of the five categories under
consideration - (I) all articles which appeared in The New York Times', (2) The New
York Times editorials; (3) front page New York Times articles; (4) all articles which
appeared in Time', and (5) Time cover stories - Ted Kaczynski was more likely than
Tim McVeigh to be defined as abnormal. In other words, his acts were more likely to
have been attributed to abnormality than those of Tim McVeigh. Again, this dynamic
held for all five categories. First, Kaczynski was defined as abnormal in 48% of The
New York Times's articles overall, compared to 6% for McVeigh. Second, Kaczynski
was defined as abnormal in 60% of The New York Times's editorials, compared to
14% for McVeigh. Third, Kaczynski was defined as abnormal in 51% of The New
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York Times's front-page articles, compared to 19% for McVeigh. Fourth, Kaczynski
was defined as abnormal in 62% of the Time articles overall, compared to 31% for
McVeigh. Fifth, Kaczynski was defined as abnormal in 80% of the Time cover
articles, compared to 33% for McVeigh.

Table 1
Abnormal
The New York Times
All Articles
Editorials
Front Page
McVeigh
Defined as
Abnormal
Kaczynski
Defined as
Abnormal

31%

33%

13 of 68

9 of 29

1 of 3

60%

51%

62%

80%

9 of 15

17 of 33

17 of 27

14%

19%

20 o f 314

4 of 28

48%
64 of 132

6%

Time
All Articles
Covers

4 of 5

Table 2 indicates the following. In each of the five categories under
consideration: 1) all articles which appeared in The New York Times 2) The New
York Times editorials 3) front page New York Times articles 4) all articles which
appeared in Time 5) Time cover stories; Tim McVeigh was more likely to have an
ideology attributed to him than Ted Kaczynski. In other words, his acts were more
likely to have been attributed to political and ideological motivation than those of Ted
Kaczynski. Again, this dynamic held for all five categories. First, an ideology was
attributed to McVeigh in 37% of The New York Times articles overall, compared to
23% for Kaczynski. Second, an ideology was attributed to McVeigh in 57% of The
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New York Times's editorials, compared to 0% for Kaczynski. Third, an ideology was
attributed to McVeigh in 47% of The New York Times's front-page articles, compared
to 30% for Kaczynski. Fourth, an ideology was attributed to McVeigh in 52% of the
Time articles overall, compared to 22% for Kaczynski. Fifth, an ideology was
attributed to McVeigh in 100% of the Time cover articles, compared to 20% for
Kaczynski.

Table 2
Ideology

All Articles

McVeigh,
Ideology
Attributed
To

Kaczynski,
Ideology
Attributed
To

37%
115 of 314

23%
30 of 132

The New York Times
Time
Editorials Front Page All Articles Covers

57%

47%
32 of 68

16 of 28

30%

0%
Oof 15

11 of 33

52%

100%

15 of 29

3 of 3

22%

20%

6 of 27

1 of 5

Qualitative Findings: Kaczynski, “Abnormal”
While quantitative analysis showed that The New York Times and Time were
both far more likely to label Kaczynski abnormal than McVeigh, qualitative analysis
revealed patterns and dynamics uncaptured by statistics. Throughout their coverage
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of Kaczynski both publications specifically depoliticized Kaczynski’s acts, his
behavior and his ideology by attributing his actions to his psychological abnormality.
Second, Kaczynski’s rejection of the labels “mentally ill” and “schizophrenic” were
taken as evidence of his illness. Kaczynski was cast as abnormal long before he was
caught and exposed as a reclusive genius hermit. Finally, qualitative analysis
revealed a strong countervailing tendency. While Kaczynski was consistently defined
as abnormal, there were points at which, particularly in The New York Times, forceful
claims were put forward rejecting the notion that Kaczynski was psychologically
abnormal.
The first article of interest appeared in Time and set a pattern. Kaczynski was
defined as a “methodical madman,” and “authorities speculate that he may have been
in prison or a psychiatric facility.” Also, FBI investigators said he was compulsive,
and he had, according to “retired FBI bomb expert James Ronay, an uncontrollable
urge to fool with his bombs’ (Gleick, 1994). Kaczynski is psychologized.
In the first New York Times article Kaczynski was framed as someone striking
out at demons, despite the article also using the word “anarchist”. He was situated as
a sick individual. Already, the motivation for his actions has been located within his
psyche. He was cast as a crazy person, not someone motivated by politics and
ideology: “’W e’d like to hear from this guy if he’s got some sort of an agenda,’ says
San Francisco Postal Inspector. ’But I doubt he’s that focused, other than to strike
out at whatever demons he’s striking out at’” (“Long-running Unabom,” 1995).
Two days later The New York Times ran a front-page article in which a letter
Kaczynski sent to several newspapers, including The New York Times, was quoted.

41

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Interestingly, Kaczynski was already well aware of the depoliticization process that
had begun to unfold. Kaczynski knew he was being marginalized, medicalized, and
depoliticized:
The FBI has tried to portray these bombings as the work of an isolated
nut. We won’t waste our time arguing about whether we are nuts, but
we certainly are not isolated. .. .anyone who will read the anarchist
and radical environmentalist journals will see that opposition to the
industrial-technological system is widespread and growing. (Barron,
1995b)

On June 30, The New York Times ran an article entitled “Bomb Hoax Leaves
Los Angeles Airport With The Jitters,” in which a “comic actor” defined Kaczynski
as a “sociopath” (Mydans, 1995).
This next article, a New York Times editorial which ran after Kaczynski sent
several letters to newspapers outlining his general view of the industrial revolution
and technology, put forth a complicated picture of the Unabomber: He was taken as a
serious thinker, but he was depoliticized and medicalized as well. The author stated
emphatically that he was not a nut, but later said he was “evidently disturbed.”
The author, a well-known technology critic, acknowledged the legitimacy of
Kaczynski’s arguments, strongly noting their resonance with sectors of the public.
He also said that Kaczynski was unbalanced.
This complex portrayal is conveyed in the following quote:
It is possible to draw a preliminary psychopolitical portrait of him.
Enough so that we can understand the Unabomber to be intelligent if
somewhat illogical, sincere if evidently disturbed, perceptive if
foolish— and a person whose ideas must be confronted. First he is not
a nut. He is a rational man and his principle beliefs are, if hardly
mainstream, entirely reasonable. He thinks that “the Industrial
Revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for the human
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race,” increasing life expectancy but causing social instability,
physical and psychological suffering, economic hardship and
environmental damage. This stands squarely in a long political
tradition...” Carlyle, Dickens, Thoreau, Veblen and Weber, Lewis
Mumford, Paul Goodman, Rachel Carson and Rene Dubos, “among
many other distinguished critics of modernity and its machines. (Sale,
1995)

He continued: “All that said, it is also obvious that the Unabomber is
measurably unbalanced” (Sale, 1995).
When Kaczynski was first identified, his Montana neighbors were quoted as
saying that Kaczynski did not seem insane to them. One neighbor described him as a
“quiet loner” and “not that remarkable.” “It seemed like he was quite intelligent”
(Kifner, 1996). Though Kaczynski’s actions were eventually attributed to
psychological abnormalities, there was nothing at this point to suggest that he was
psychologically abnormal, that he was not what he claimed to be: a politically
motivated terrorist. His neighbor, quoted above, saw no abnormality. His captors also
noticed nothing to suggest psychological abnormality either, as the following quote
from the front page of The New York Times makes clear:
The officials said that Mr. Kaczynski tried to withdraw inside the
cabin, but was restrained. After his capture, Mr. Kaczynski gave no
further resistance, but instead, one official said, became “quite
personable and well spoken,” but asked for a lawyer. Although a
psychological profile suggested he might be eager to cooperate, he
declined to answer questions but engaged in pleasant small talk with
the agents...(Johnston, 1996)

Kaczynski was also called a “sociopath” and a “madman” in a Time cover
story that appeared April 15, 1996. According to Time, authorities believed they had
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“not only stopped an 18-year crime spree but also bagged an exceptional specimen:
the brilliant sociopath who made himself virtually invisible (Gibbs, 1996).
Throughout the coverage of Kaczynski there was disagreement and tension
over whether he was psychologically abnormal or not and whether his actions were
politically or psychologically motivated: were his actions motivated by sickness or
politics? An article that reflected these tensions appeared in The New York Times on
April 21. In this article, Kaczynski was cast as a sexual psychopath and linked with
Ted Bundy, but was pulled back into political frame by authors Joyce Carol Oates
and Dean Koontz. Whereas Kaczynski’s neighbors said he did not seem insane to
them, these authors specifically attributed political motivation to Kaczynski. First,
Kaczynski was linked with Ted Bundy and Jeffrey Dahmer:
The Unabomber, who attacked through the mail, at first seems to have
little in common with sexual psychopaths like Bundy or Jeffrey
Dahmer, whose sadistic murders were committed at close range. But
many experts, including the FBI serial crime unit that tracked the
Unabomber for years, consider him a member of the fold. (Gabriel,
1996)

Authors Oates and Koontz, however, did not cast Kaczynski as a sexual
psychopath, instead seeing him as politically motivated. The article said of Oates:
“ ...she is intrigued by his resemblance to fanatic ideologues like John Brown, the
abolitionist who murdered supporters of slavery in the 1850’s.” Oates specifically
cast Kaczynski as a politically motivated figure: “.. .he is in this very American
tradition of using violence for some ideal.” Author Dean Koontz viewed Kaczynski in
much the same light, as the following paragraph indicates:

44

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The very espousal of ideology, as manifested in the Unabomber’s anti
technology diatribe and his targeting of computer-science professors,
is met with deep indifference by other authors. “I don’t consider him a
serial killer, because he’s politically motivated,” said Dean Koontz.
“As soon as he begins to have an agenda, and it’s political, it becomes
tedious to me.” (Gabriel, 1996)

An interesting pattern was established in the next Time article. This and
several subsequent articles contained speculation that Kaczynski’s actions could be
attributed to an illness Kaczynski suffered in childhood. Former Chairman of the
Mathematics Department at the University of California, Berkeley, was quoted as
saying Kaczynski was “almost pathologically shy.” Time then posed the question:
“Was Ted different almost from the start? Investigators say that at the
age of six months he was hospitalized for several weeks after suffering
an allergic reaction to a drug. During that time, his parents were not
allowed to hold or hug him. When he came home, they found him
listless and withdrawn”. (Lacayo, 1996)

In searching for a biological explanation for Kaczynski’s actions he was
depoliticized. His actions were clearly framed as emanating from and explained by
sickness. He sent bombs not because he was a politically motivated actor, but because
he was mentally ill.
Time presented a poet’s analysis of Kaczynski’s actions in “Robert Bly On
The Mind Of The Unabomber Suspect.” Bly acknowledged Kaczynski’s attempts at
protesting technology, then depoliticized Kaczynski’s actions, moving them from the
political realm to the psychological or medical realm. The article is quoted at length
below:
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No one has written more vividly about today’s troubled male
psyche than the poet Robert Bly, author of the best-selling Iron John.
TIME asked Bly to reflect on the Unabomber suspect’s behavior.
The actions of the Unabomber give evidence of a protest
against technology, and possibly a serious form of mental illness.
Details of his life also show a pattern of regression to younger and
younger stages, a pattern we may see repeated around us in the coming
years.
In the case of Theodore J. Kaczynski, the retreat to Montana
without the community of his peers seems to be a retreat to childhood.
His withdrawal has the unresponsive quality of a boy who wants to
show his parents they can’t abandon him— he will abandon them.
As the late Austrian child psychoanalyst Melanie Klein noted,
the thwarted infant feels a desire to tear up everything... (Bly, 1996)

The New York Times ran a front-page article on May 26, 1996, in which
Kaczynski was depoliticized and medicalized. Cast as a sick individual, his actions
were again said to have been caused by the childhood illness identified earlier:
David and his parents had long worried over T ed’s anger and
wondered at its origins...when he was only 9 months old, an unusual
medical problem arose. David, who had been told the story by his
parents, said the infant Teddy developed a severe allergy and was
hospitalized for a week. There were rigid regulations about when
parents could and couldn’t visit, David said.
After Teddy came home, he became very unresponsive, David
said. “He had been a smiling, happy jovial kind of baby beforehand,
and when he returned from the hospital, he showed little emotions for
months.” (McFadden, 1996)

An interesting article appeared in Time, July 29, 1996, in which Kaczynski
was depoliticized by comparing him to a paranoid schizophrenic. The article stated:
“We know that the mentally ill— paranoid schizophrenics, for example— hear
menacing voices speaking from unlikely sources (harmless strangers, inanimate
objects), or they read malignant meanings into random events, or they think the very
furniture will rise up and murder them” (Morrow, 1996).
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Later, Kaczynski’s refusal to accept his lawyers plan to portray him as
suffering from a mental defect was taken as evidence that he does suffer from mental
illness, specifically paranoid schizophrenia. It was a line that was repeated not once
or twice, but consistently.
In the meantime, the portrayal of Kaczynski’s mental state was not cut and
dried. Psychiatrists questioned people from Kaczynski’s town in Montana:
Was he mentally ill? O r not? The inquisitive visitors were two
prosecution psychiatrists, and the answers they got may not help the
‘mental defect’ defense that Kaczynski’s lawyers are planning for his
trial.... “I can’t imagine anybody saying he’s insane,” says Becky
Garland, 41, who befriended Kaczynski while working at Garland’s
Town & Country store in Lincoln. (Jackson, 1997a)

Two other neighbors were quoted as saying that Kaczynski was sane, including one
who said, “I always though that he acted, for a person who was a recluse, well within
the bounds of society” (Jackson, 1997a).
The next article of interest appeared in Time, November 17, 1997. This article
set a pattern: from this point until he pled guilty and was sentenced, Ted Kaczynski’s
refusal to accept the label of mental illness generally, and paranoid schizophrenic
specifically, was taken as evidence of mental illness. The following lengthy quote
sets the context and reveals this dynamic:
Kaczynski’s defense strategy is in turmoil. The first public
sign of trouble was the Harvard graduate’s abrupt refusal to be
examined by prosecution psychiatrists. But time has learned that he
initially resisted examination by even his own doctors.. They had
planned to argue that Kaczynski suffers from paranoid
schizophrenia...But now U.S. District Court Judge Garland Burrell Jr.
is weighing a prosecution request to bar all expert psychiatric
testimony, leaving his defense in tatters.
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But if the jury in this case is allowed to hear details about
paranoid schizophrenia, they may see some disturbing parallels with
Kaczynski’s life. For example, psychiatrists say true schizophrenics
often resist diagnosis. ‘T hey don’t like to think of themselves as
mentally ill,” says Dr. Ira Glick, a Professor of Psychiatry at Stanford.
‘T h e y ’d think something else caused their problems, like bad
parenting or bad government or too many drugs— anything but being
labeled crazy.” (Jackson, 1997b)

A point to which Time added: “Kaczynski has lashed out at both his parents
and government.” Lashing out at one’s parents and government was taken as
evidence of schizophrenia. The same can be said of Timothy McVeigh: He “lashed
out” at the government and he also lashed out at his mother, calling her a “slut” and a
“whore.” Was this taken as evidence that Timothy McVeigh was a paranoid
schizophrenic? No.
In this article a biological explanation for Kaczynski’s alleged actions was
also sought, once again focused on his childhood illness. The article stated:
The mystery illness that sent Kaczynski to the hospital when he was
only 10 months old could take on new significance. Some researchers
believe that schizophrenia could come from a virus that strikes
pregnant mothers and infants, causing brain damage that usually
doesn’t become fully apparent until the teens or early 20’s.
Kaczynski’s family has said he was always an anti-social child and
that his behavior got worse as he got older. At 26, he abruptly
resigned from a prestigious teaching post at the University of
California, Berkeley and dropped out of society. The first Unabom
attack occurred three days after his 36th birthday. (Jackson, 1997b)

At this point Kaczynski’s ‘mental state’ was the focus of both The Times and
Time. Four days later The N ew York Times repeated the claims o f the alleged
Unabomber’s lawyers: “M r Kaczynski’s lawyers say their client is so delusional that
he denies that he is mentally ill.” Kaczynski’s alleged criminal actions were
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medicalized, his refusal to accept the label of paranoid schizophrenic was
medicalized, and his refusal to be examined by psychiatrists was medicalized: The
defense lawyers said part of Mr. Kaczynski’s illness was a “pathological fear” of
psychiatrists that explained why he refused to be examined by prosecution experts.
This article also mentioned, for the third time, Kaczynski’s alleged belief that
he was controlled by an omnipotent organization: “The defense quoted one of its own
psychiatrists, David Vemon Foster, who said Mr. Kaczynski felt ‘that every aspect of
his existence is controlled by an omnipotent organization against which he is
powerless.’” When it was reported that McVeigh had claimed the Government
implanted a computer chip in his buttocks no speculation regarding his mental state
followed (Glaberson, 1997b).
The Times understood Kaczynski’s rejection of the mental illness label to be a
symptom of his mental illness:
David Kaczynski, who turned in his brother to the authorities, has been
asserting that Mr. Kaczynski’s mental illness explains his actions and
would make a death penalty inhumane. David Kaczynski has long
said his brother’s staunch denial that he has mental problems is a clear
symptom of how ill he is. (Glaberson, 1997b)

A similar line was reported from David Kaczynski’s attorney, who claimed
Ted’s handling o f his case provided evidence of his mental illness:
Today, Mr. Bisceglie said the withdrawal of the effort to assert a
mental defect argument was continuing evidence of Theodore
Kaczynski’s distorted view of reality. “It proves what my client has
been saying for months and months,” he said, “and that is that Ted
Kaczynski is fixated in his denial that he is suffering from a mental
illness.” (Glaberson, 1997b)
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The same day The Times ran an editorial in which they repeated the notion
that Kaczynski’s alleged actions were explained by mental illness. They also
repeated the claim that Kaczynski suffered “...delusions that he is controlled by
satellites.” O f Kaczynski’s mental state they said he was someone “ ... who, by all
outward signs, suffers from severe mental illness.” In this article the alleged actions
of Ted Kaczynski were depoliticized and medicalized: he was not a politically
motivated actor, but a sick man in need of help (“Wrong step in,” 1997).
Kaczynski was again depoliticized and medicalized in a New York Times
editorial that ran in January 1998. According to The Times, Kaczynski “ ...shows
signs of being severely mentally disturbed.” In addition, the claim that Kaczynski
believed he was controlled by satellites was repeated. Finally, his refusal to
cooperate with defense lawyers who planned to portray him as a paranoid delusional
schizophrenic was presented as potential evidence of illness:
...Judge Garland Burrell Jr. denied Mr. Kaczynski’s request to dismiss
his lawyers and issued a ruling that allowed them to carry on a mental
defect defense over his objections. The ruling apparently led Mr.
Kaczynski to demand that he be allowed to represent himself. That
request caused Judge Burrell to question Mr. Kaczynski’s mental
fitness to make such a critical decision. (‘T h e Unabom travesty,”
1998)

Time's coverage followed the pattern, typically taking for granted that
Kaczynski was mentally ill and interpreting his resistance to the label of
schizophrenic as evidence of schizophrenia. In fact, this was done in the article’s
headline: “At His Own Request: Is Kaczynski’s Rejection of his Best Chance for a
Defense a Result of Paranoid Schizophrenia?”
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In the opening paragraph Kaczynski’s mental illness was taken for granted:
‘T ed Kaczynski has one big problem: he is apparently too crazy to appreciate how
crazy he is ....” Several paragraphs below, reference is made to “ . . .the particular
illness he has.” Finally, insanity was said to be “the most obvious defense.”
Later, as was the pattern, his resistance to the label was taken as evidence of
illness: “His lawyers had planned to argue that he suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia.... But paranoid schizophrenics typically resist being labeled mentally
ill, and Kaczynski proved to be all too typical.” Clearly, Kaczynski was depoliticized
and medicalized. His actions were attributed to illness (Jackson, 1998a).
Not everyone believed Kaczynski was mentally ill, however, or that his
actions were motivated by schizophrenia. In a New York Times editorial, noted social
scientist James Q. Wilson clearly and forcefully attempted to pull Kaczynski back
into a political context. According to Wilson:
If Mr. Kaczynski is as competent today as he was over the 10 years
when prosecutors say he killed three people and injured 28 others, he
is highly rational. There is nothing in the manifesto that looks at all
like the work of a madman. The language is clear, precise and calm.
The argument is subtle and carefully developed, lacking anything even
faintly resembling the wild claims or irrational speculation that a
lunatic might produce. If it is the work of a madman, then the writings
of many political philosophers— Jean Jacques Rousseau, Tom Paine,
Karl Marx— are scarcely more sane. Assuming that Mr. Kaczynski is
the Unabomber, then his manifesto, his skill in manufacturing bombs
and the clever ways in which he concealed his identity suggest to me
that he was clearly sane by any reading of the Federal test. He did not
hallucinate, had no bizarre delusions and clearly knew what he was
doing and that it was (by the standards of a society he disliked) illegal.
(Wilson, 1998)
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W ilson’s opinions regarding Kaczynski, however, were drowned out. The
following day Kaczynski’s refusal to cooperate with defense lawyers’ was again
understood as evidence o f his illness. According to The Times, defense lawyers “...
have said Mr. Kaczynski’s mental illness includes a heightened sensitivity to being
labeled mentally ill, which makes it impossible for him to endure a defense that
would say he suffers from paranoid schizophrenia” (Glaberson, 1998a).
In the following Time article the alleged actions of Kaczynski were
depoliticized. Time labeled him insane, repeating the mantra that his rejection of the
mental illness label is actually evidence of his illness. There was a clear assumption
throughout the article that Kaczynski was mentally ill. Early on it was stated:
“America’s legal system is laced with protections for people who are too sick to know
what they are doing or what is best for them.” The article continued, “Just what does
the U.S. Constitution owe a mad genius?” (Jackson, 1998b). Kaczynski’s actions
during the trial: His refusal to cooperate with his lawyers and his expressed desire to
act as his own lawyer were portrayed as evidence of illness.
Two days later, on January 21, The Times reported that Dr. Sally Johnson, a
court appointed psychiatrist proclaimed Kaczynski competent to stand trial despite
suffering from “serious mental illness,” including “schizophrenia, paranoid type.”
Significantly, his alleged actions were defined as emanating from his illness.
Kaczynski was not a politically motivated actor, but a sick man, motivated by
paranoid schizophrenia, who needed help:
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The lawyer who read Dr. Johnson’s report said it suggested a direct
link between Mr. Kaczynski’s mental illness and the Unabom
campaign. “Consistent with other individuals with persecutory types
o f delusions,” said a report excerpt provided by the lawyer, “he is
resentful and angry and fantasizes and actually does resort to violence
against those individuals and organizations that he believes are hurting
him.” (Glaberson, 1998d)

Two days later, on the 23rd, The New York Times reported that Kaczynski
pled guilty, avoiding a death sentence. According to The Times: ‘Theodore
Kaczynski had been fighting an increasingly futile battle to, in effect insist on his
sanity.”
Again, his refusal to cooperate with his lawyers, defined here as
“unpredictable behavior in court,” was taken as evidence of illness. Kaczynski was
described as a “ ...m an whose insanity seemed evident.” He was medicalized
(Glaberson, 1998c).
That same day The Times reported that the plea bargain was “common sense,”
given that “Mr. Kaczynski’s mental illness threatened to disrupt the progress of any
trial and made him a dubious target for execution.” “Disrupting the trial,” as it meant
in previous articles, is what Kaczynski has done in rejecting the defense strategy of
his lawyers. Actions that could be politically motivated were understood as a
symptom of illness.
Also interesting to note was The Times's desire to end speculation as to
Kaczynski’s mental state. Dr. Johnson labeled him a paranoid schizophrenic, the
same label applied by Kaczynski’s defense team, who obviously had a vested interest
in their client being defined as mentally ill in order to avoid a death penalty. The
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Times defined this as “expert consensus”: “Given expert consensus on his condition, a
jury might well have found Mr. Kaczynski not guilty by reason of insanity”.
Finally, we see the last claims that Kaczynski is not mentally ill snuffed out
by the authority of the medical model:
Advocates of the death penalty for Mr. Kaczynski have said that his
ability to create bizarre legal problems is evidence that he is clever and
sane. But the medical evaluations show otherwise. Public safety and
the interests of humane justice are best served by a life sentence
without parole. (“Justice in the,” 1998)

In accord with a general feature of the medical model, the outcome is defined as
being in the best interest of Kaczynski, what The Times called “humane justice.”
The following day The Times ran an interesting front-page article under the
headline “Evil, or Sick, to his Core: Two views of Unabomber.” The headline was
revealing. Readers were only given two options: he had to be evil or sick. At this
point, there was very little suggestion that Kaczynski was a politically motivated
actor (Glaberson, 1998b).
Kaczynski’s brother was also quoted one last time: ‘T o David, his brother
remains a person with a core of humanity whose horrible acts were caused by
psychosis. ‘I think what we have seen from Ted is still a manifestation of his illness,’
he said.” Kaczynski’s behavior was medicalized one last time.

Qualitative Findings: McVeigh, “Abnormal”
This first article on Tim McVeigh, a front page article from The New York
Times, set a pattern which endured throughout The New York Times’s and Time's
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coverage: His alleged abnormalities were cast as political. Here, and in many of the
following articles, he was said to be “obsessed” with the date April 19, 1995, the date
the Waco siege ended in the deaths of 56 Branch Davidians (McFadden, 1995a.).
On this first day of coverage, The New York Times ran several articles on
McVeigh. In addition to being described as “obsessed” with the date the Waco siege
ended, McVeigh was said to be “enraged” over Waco, as described in the lead
paragraph of this next article: “Just 48 hours after the Oklahoma City bombing, the
authorities on Friday arrested a suspect whom a witness described in court papers as
enraged over the federal raid on the BD compound near Waco, Tex, two years to the
day before the blast.” (Purdum, 1995). On this initial day o f coverage this was as
close as The New York Times came to raising the issue of whether Mr. McVeigh was
abnormal.
The next article, which appeared on The New York Times editorial page on
April 24, 1995, followed the same pattern of casting McVeigh’s alleged abnormalities
as political abnormalities. The opening paragraph of this initial New York Times
editorial comment on McVeigh stated: “Can the Oklahoma City bombing be the
product o f a rage against the federal government so paranoid and demented that those
in its grip thought to strike a blow for freedom by demolishing a federal building,
killing scores of innocent individuals inside? (“A twisted rage,” 1995).
“Paranoid” and “demented” were used in a political context. There was no
suggestion that those responsible for the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building
were actually mentally ill.
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On that same day, April 24,1995, The New York Times ran an article detailing
McVeigh’s love of weapons. He

. .carried a 9-millimeter Glock handgun loaded

with ‘cop killer’ bullets, and shared the pathological hatred of the federal government
that motivates most extreme right organizations” (Schmemann, 1995).
On April 26, The New York Times ran an article under the byline “Many
Theories About Choice of Target,” which speculated that the Murrah Federal
Building may have been specifically targeted because of its on-site day-care center,
which was demolished in the blast, killing 19 children, an aspect of the bombing
which received a good deal of media coverage. For purposes of this dissertation, it is
interesting to note that neither The New York Times nor Time took this opportunity to
speculate as to whether McVeigh might have been abnormal. These publications did
not even pose the question, let alone answer it. One might, for example, have raised
the issue somewhere in the following sentences, which appeared in The New York
Times:
And in plainly the most diabolical theory o f all, the Murrah building
may have been chosen specifically because its layout insured that a
bomb could be placed so close to children, in the America’s Kids day
care center on the second floor. Federal buildings elsewhere in the
south-central United States, including Dallas, Denver and Kansas City,
Mo., either do not have day-care centers or place them in areas
somewhat less accessible to a bomb. (Verhovek, 1995)

This article contained an implicit assumption that the bomber or bombers
were not psychologically abnormal, but that they were rational, politically motivated
people, as the following paragraph indicated: “There is simply no way to know if this
was on the bombers’ minds. But if it was, there was logic to the awful choice: the
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second-floor, window location of the day-care center in the Murrah building was just
above where the truck blew up.”
As we will see in the following pages, this article established a pattern: The
New York Times and Time mentioned the large number o f dead children without even
raising the issue of whether or not the person or people responsible were
psychologically abnormal.
On April 26, The New York Times van another editorial dealing with the
Oklahoma City bombing, in which the far right was characterized as possessing a
“paranoid ideology.” As in the initial New York Times editorial, this paranoia was a
political paranoia that, according to this article, was part of a larger ideology
(Hasselbach, 1995).
Another editorial appeared the next day, also casting McVeigh and the
Oklahoma City bombing as being motivated by political paranoia. This editorial
spoke of President Clinton’s reference to militias as “promoters of paranoia.” (Rich,
1995). Clearly, this “paranoia” was cast as a political paranoia. There was no
suggestion that these folks, McVeigh foremost among them, were psychologically
abnormal. Rather, they were politically and ideologically motivated.
This next article, which appeared on the front page of The New York Times on
April 29, 1995, was very interesting. The children who died in the blast were
mentioned, but there was no speculation as to whether or not McVeigh was abnormal.
This failure to pose what might be considered a very obvious, legitimate, and relevant
question was highlighted by the many questions this article did pose. In all, about
twenty questions were posed of McVeigh, none o f which dealt with whether he was
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abnormal. Questions included: Who is the second suspect? Who else may have
helped carry out the attack? What were the plans behind it? Where did Mr. McVeigh
spend recent months? When was the bomb built? What was the specific target of the
blast?
The following passages from the article reveal a lack of interest in the
question o f whether McVeigh was abnormal, and are quoted at length:
A week after the Federal Bureau of Investigation found Timothy J.
McVeigh, a drifting Army veteran, sitting in a county jail in Perry,
Oklahoma, the list of questions about him and the Oklahoma City
bombing continues to grow. Why Oklahoma City? Was the bombers’
target the entire Federal Government and everything it represents?
Was it the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, And Firearms? Did the
bombers know there was a day-care center in the building they
destroyed? If so, did they pick their target to avenge the death of
children in a second Federal raid on the Branch Davidian compound,
the operation that brought the fire ending a two-month Government
siege there? How did he get the money to live and, by the authorities
account, spend money on the plot? Was he selling weapons, legally or
illegally? Was he involved in a recent string of unsolved bank
robberies throughout the Midwest? Did he receive financial support
from people who were aware of plans for the bombing? Who is the
second suspect? Where and when was the bomb built, and who
supplied the materials? Where was Mr. McVeigh headed when he was
arrested? How did it come to pass that he was driving a car without
license plates when the Oklahoma state trooper, Charles Hanger,
stopped him? Was he so foolish as to believe that he could speed
down an open highway with no tags in broad daylight and escape a
patrolman’s attention? (Weiner, 1995b)

Though the dead children were mentioned, and in the article a friend of
McVeigh’s was quoted as saying that “Mr. McVeigh had returned believing that the
Army had implanted a computer chip in his buttocks in order to keep him under
surveillance,” there was no suggestion on the part o f The New York TimesJhat one
who made such a claim might be abnormal. Again, the issue was not raised. The
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oversight seems more glaring in light of the many, many questions they did ask about
McVeigh.
Time magazine’s initial coverage of McVeigh was a cover story and followed
the pattern set by The New York Times in two ways. First, as in The New York Times
article discussed in the previous paragraph, this article mentioned that McVeigh
reportedly claimed to have had a computer chip implanted in his buttocks while in the
Army as a means of surveillance. The New York Times did not speculate on
McVeigh’s mental state and neither did Time: “His politics veered far rightward. He
claimed that the army had implanted a computer chip in his buttocks” (Gleick,
1995b). Such a claim might reasonably have raised speculation as to whether he was
abnormal. Here, Time seemed to attribute this claim to his “politics,” which “veered
far rightward.”
Time's coverage also mirrored that of The New York Times in casting
McVeigh’s alleged abnormalities as politically motivated. For example, rather than
simply labeling McVeigh “paranoid,” he was cast as a politically paranoid, which he
was said to share with other militia members. Time said of McVeigh and the militias:
“It is clear that the members, along with those in similar groups throughout the
country, nurture a profound paranoia about the federal government even as they
express their deepest patriotism.”
McVeigh’s “obsession” with guns was now cast in terms of a defense of the
Second Amendment. Rather than being a simple “fanatic,” McVeigh was described
as fanatical about protecting the Second Amendment:
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According to Kerry Kling, who served in M cVeigh’s platoon, he was
fanatical and loved to collect guns, and he always had a gun with him.
He was a calm, laid-back person. But he felt strongly about the right
to bear arms and protecting the Second Amendment— he was fanatical
about that. (McFadden, 1995a)

This article also detailed McVeigh’s failed attempt to join the Army’s Special Forces.
From reading the article one might reasonably have raised questions as to the impact
of this failure on his mental state and normalcy. The Times skirted around the issue,
and did not follow it up with any suggestion, let alone discussion, that McVeigh
might be abnormal. According to The New York Times, McVeigh: “ .. .saw his
cherished hope of becoming a Green Beret shattered by psychological tests. It was
apparently a blow so crushing that he quit the Army and went into a psychic tailspin.”
More specifically:
It was his dream to join the Special Forces, the elite Green Berets, and
he returned from the war early for training. But he left on the second
day of a 210th day assessment period, and military officials said that
preliminary psychological screening had shown him to be unfit. The
death of this dream appears to have been a major turning point for a
man who had dedicated himself to the service. (McFadden, 1995a)

On May 8, 1995 Time again ran a cover story on McVeigh in which his
alleged abnormality was put into a political context and the children who died in the
collapse of the Murrah Federal Building were mentioned, but there was no
speculation as to McVeigh’s normalcy.
First, McVeigh was again said to be “obsessed” with guns. Time even
detailed his arsenal: “McVeigh was obsessed with guns. He often kept a 9-mm
Glock pistol in the barracks with him— not locked up in the arms room, as rules
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require. His personal arsenal, including a Czech machine gun and assorted pistols,
shotguns, and rifles, was stashed in the trunk of his car” (Gleick, 1995a).
As for the children: “Even when confronted last week with photographs of the
children carried from the crumpled Alfred P. Murrah federal building— some bloody
and numb with shock, others already dead— McVeigh appeared unshaken. The
accused bomber seems to have decided that he is a prisoner of war” (Gleick, 1995a).
McVeigh’s lack of emotion in regard to the children obviously raised some
eyebrows, but no speculation in regard to McVeigh’s normalcy. Instead, the scene
was again cast in a political context.
The next article offered The New York Times another perfect opportunity to
raise the issue of McVeigh’s normalcy. But they did not. In this article, Stephen
Jones, McVeigh’s lawyer, asked the judge to remove a surveillance camera from his
cell, but there was no speculation as to McVeigh’s normalcy. The Times quoted
Jones: “I see the camera as simply an attempt to engage in psychological warfare,
and I think, ultimately, perhaps, it would have an effect on his mental stability...”
(Belluck, 1995a).
At this point the dead children have returned. In this and several other
articles that mentioned the dead children McVeigh’s stoicism and lack of emotion
were obviously at issue. In several early articles on the children, they were simply
mentioned. Perhaps the death toll was given, but McVeigh’s lack of emotion or
apparent remorse did not surface until his trial. Neither Time nor The New York Times
asked whether one who might have knowingly bombed a day-care center might have
been abnormal or even insane. Even when the defendant sat unemotionally when
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confronted with photos of dead children the print media under consideration failed to
ask seemingly relevant and legitimate questions. The New York Times:
Mr. McVeigh, who wore civilian rather than prison clothes for the first
time today, had looked animated and at ease all week, smiling at his
lawyers and angering some of the bombing victims. ‘T h e smugness of
him,” Arlene Blanchard, an army sergeant who survived the blast, said
on Wednesday. “Even if he is not guilty, how can he be so callous?
All the children and the vanished hopes? How can he sit there with
that attitude, not caring?” (Thomas, 1996)

Next were several articles in which the notion that McVeigh needed a body
count to make his political point was not cause to question his normalcy. On March
1, The New York Times reported:
During an interview in July 1995, Mr. McVeigh was asked about an
anti-government activist’s assertion that he would have been a hero if
he had bombed the building at night when fewer people would have
been killed... Mr. McVeigh looked directly into my eyes and told me
‘T hat would not have gotten the point across to the government. We
needed a body count to make our point.” (Brooke, 1997)

The Times ran the same quote the following day (Thomas, 1997d). A person
has inflicted this philosophy on a civilian population in his own country and the print
media did not even question McVeigh’s normalcy. The following day the body count
quote was mentioned yet again (Myerson, 1997).
Time also reported the alleged body count remark: Why didn’t you bomb the
Alfred P Murrah federal building at night, when fewer people would be killed? The
prisoner looked his interlocutor in the eye and said, “that would not have gotten the
point across to the government. We needed a body count to make our point.” (Chua-
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Goan, 1997). Time magazine, like The New York Times, did not define this as reason
to raise the issue of McVeigh’s normalcy.
On May 13, 1997 an article appeared on the front page of The New York
Times in which McVeigh compared the people in the Alfred Murrah building to
stormtroopers in the movie Star Wars. As The Times reported:
Mr. McVeigh originally set the hour for the blast at 11A.M. because
“everybody would be getting ready for lunch,” Mr. Fortier testified.
And when Mr. Fortier protested that the bombing would kill a lot of
people, he said Mr. McVeigh replied that he “considered all those
people to be as if they were storm troopers in the movie Star Wars.
They may be individually innocent, but because they are part of the
evil empire they were guilty by association.” (Thomas, 1997a).

Again, The New York Times did not view this comparison allegedly made by Mr.
McVeigh as reason to question his normalcy.
When McVeigh was sentenced to death in June of 1997 it was front
page news. The New York Times again pointed out his stoicism and lack of remorse
without raising the issue of M cVeigh’s normalcy: ‘T h e prosecutors did not mention
the killer’s apparent lack of remorse, but it seemed evident in the courtroom: Mr.
McVeigh never shed a tear during heart-wrenching testimony that had men and
women on the jury weeping and reaching for their handkerchiefs” (Thomas, 1997c).
The Times also offered a post-conviction editorial assessment, entitled “The
Militia Threat,” in which McVeigh’s alleged abnormalities were understood in a
political context. As throughout, the paranoia is political. As The Times put it, ‘T h e
militias are a particularly insidious strain of the American viruses of paranoia and
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violence. They echo the white supremacy of the Ku KIux Klan and the conspiracy
theories and gun obsessions of the John Birch Society” (1997).
Time offered post-conviction comment on McVeigh as well, continuing the
pattern set early on and followed by both print media sources under consideration in
this dissertation: At seemingly obvious points in their coverage of the McVeigh case
questions might reasonably have been asked about his normalcy but were not. None
of the three articles in the June 16, 1997 edition of Time posed questions regarding
McVeigh’s normalcy. In one article, the defense was said to eschew a severe mental
disturbance defense in favor of ideological explanation. McVeigh was not cast as
abnormal. Instead, he was cast as a revolutionary. He was sincerely motivated by
anger over the Federal assault at Waco. The article mentioned his “blank look at
trial,” but there was no suggestion of abnormality, as there might reasonably have
been, especially in light o f the lengthy, and final, quote that follows:
O f all the people involved in the case, the one who has been the most
stoical is the defendant. He showed no emotion when the verdicts
were read, nor did he react during the testimony of the victims last
week. While others wept, he sat at the defense table in his impassive
pose, with his chin resting on his hands. Lawyers and spectators were
shocked that McVeigh remained so unmoved, and the jury may also
have been affected. (“Death or life,” 1997)

The article continued:

,

That afternoon, Kathleen Treanor took the stand and told about kissing
her four-year-old daughter Ashley goodbye and never seeing her alive
again. After unspeakable days of waiting, Treanor recovered Ashley’s
body from the rubble, buried the little girl, and trudged on. Seven
months later, someone called form the medical examiner’s office. “He
said, ‘W e have recovered a portion of Ashley’s hand,”’ Treanor
testified in a trembling voice that rose as she fought to get through
each sentence, “ ’and we wanted to know if you wanted that buried in
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the mass grave or if you would like to have it.’ And I said, ‘O f course,
I want it. It’s a part of her.’” (“Death or life,” 1997)

Finally:
That was about all she could manage. Treanor dissolved, her body
racked by sobs, and almost everyone in the courtroom dissolved with
her. Jurors wept openly, survivors wailed, reporters groped for
hankies and sodden bits of tissue. Through it all sat McVeigh, cold
and silent as stone. (“Death or life,” 1995)

Qualitative Findings: Kaczynski, “Ideology”
Quantitative analysis showed that The New York Times and Time were much
more likely to attribute a political ideology and motivation to McVeigh, thereby
depoliticizing Kaczynski, in comparison. Qualitative analysis, however, revealed that
even when an ideology was attributed to Kaczynski his actions were often
depoliticized and sometimes medicalized in the same article. Also, in several articles
Kaczynski’s ideas received favorable and serious coverage but were not identified as
part of an overall political ideology. Qualitative evidence of these patterns and
dynamics is presented in the following pages.
In this initial Time article the actions of the Unabomber were depoliticized,
even though he was quoted describing himself as an anarchist. A self-described
anarchist mailed a bomb to an advertising executive and people were at a loss as to
why someone might do such a thing. It was not understood as a political act:
But what people who knew the 50-year old advertising executive still
cannot fathom is why—why Tom Mosser? Recently promoted to one
of the top jobs at Young & Rubican and described by friends and
colleagues as quiet and reliable, he was a family man who on the day
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o f his death had planned to go Christmas tree shopping with his wife
and children. (Gleick, 1994)

The article continued with a quote from friend James Dowling, an ad executive at
Burson Marstellar: “With death by natural causes, it’s easier, because you think there
is a reason for it. Here there is no reason...” (Gleick, 1994).
In the initial New York Times article, though an ideology was attributed to the
Unabomber, he was depoliticized and medicalized: “In a letter to The New York
Times in June 1993, the bomber said he belonged to an anarchist group.” However,
later in the same paragraph the Unabomber was said to be “striking out at demons.”
The actions of the Unabomber were not defined as politically motivated acts (“Longrunning Unabom,” 1995).
The following day on the front page, The Times depoliticized the actions of
the Unabomber by simply mentioning, again, that they received a letter in 1993 in
which the Unabomber claimed to be an anarchist. The Times mentioned anarchism
but there was no further definition or discussion of anarchism (Noble, 1995b).
The next day the Unabomber was again front-page news in The Times, and
again his actions were depoliticized, this time by putting quotes around anarchist.
Clearly, they were reluctant to accept the claim that he was a politically motivated
anarchist.
The Unabomber’s actions were depoliticized in other ways as well. Referring
to letters sent by the Unabomber to several publications, including The Times, they
said: “The letter offered the most detailed explanation yet of what the bomber says
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are his motives.” But there was no mention of these motives in this paragraph.
Instead, the next sentence focused on his ‘‘taunting of the FBI.”
Though they described the content of the letter, which cast the killing of ad
executive Thomas Mosser as a politically motivated crime, they were clearly
unwilling to accept this as a political crime, using marginalizing language. The
Unabomber was said to “complain” about the public relations industry:
The agency was mentioned in a paragraph that said the bomber had
built the package bomb that killed Thomas Mosser, a longtime
Burson-Marstellar executive...the letter complained that the agency’s
business “is the development of techniques for manipulating people’s
attitudes.” (Barron, 1995b)

Though an article on the letters sent by the Unabomber appeared on the front
page of The Times, excerpts from the letter were reserved for page sixteen, where
Kaczynski was allowed to define anarchism and state his motivation:
Since “anarchist” is a vague word that has been applied to a variety of
attitudes, further explanation is needed. We call ourselves anarchists
because we would like, ideally, to break down all society into very
small, completely autonomous units. Regrettably, we don’t see any
clear road to this goal.. .Our more immediate goal.. .is the destruction
o f the worldwide industrial system.

This goal was not revealed in the front-page article on the letter. Kaczynski was
allowed to define his goals on page sixteen: “Through our bombing we hope to
promote social instability in industrial society, propagate anti-industrial ideas and
give encouragement to those who hate the industrial system.” Finally: “.. .anyone
who will read the anarchist and radical environmentalist journals will see that
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opposition to the industrial-technological system is widespread and growing”
(“Excerpts from letter,” 1995).
On May 7, 1995 The Times ran an interesting article which presented the
actions of the Unabomber as politically and ideologically motivated. The article
featured an interview with anarchist author John Zerzan, ‘anarchist’ was even used in
the headline: “Prominent Anarchist Finds Unsought Ally in Serial Bomber.”
The Unabomber was linked with Zerzan and anarchism: “But just before his
most recent attack, which killed a timber industry executive in Sacramento, California
on April 24, he left a number of intriguing leads in letters that described his hatred of
technology and his desire for an anarchist world.” Zerzan himself was allowed to
comment on the Unabomber’s letter to The Times, calling it “a pretty thoroughgoing
critique.”
Zerzan was even allowed to present his ideas:
Mr. Zerzan himself believes that technology is by its nature a master
o f mankind and therefore antithetical to freedom. “There are a lot of
anarchists who have no beef whatsoever with technology. They would
just like to see a world in which technology serves, and so forth. Our
point of view is that that’s a tremendous illusion, that the
impoverishment of society and the individual is just not going to be
changed with modem technology. That’s right at the heart of what is
so chronically wrong with the fabric of society.” (Noble, 1995c)

The Times again linked the Unabomber to Zerzan: “The serial bomber expressed a
similar ideal in his letter to The Times.”
A prominent critic of technology was even allowed to speculate that the
Unabomber had this specific anarchist author, Zerzan, in mind when he made
reference to “anarchists and radical environmentalists” in his letter:
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Kirkpatrick Sale, an author who has written extensively and
skeptically about technology and who describes himself as “a great
admirer of Zerzan,” said he would not be surprised if Mr. Zerzan was
among those the bomber had in mind when he referred in his letter to
anarchists and radical environmentalism. (Noble, 1995c)

Interestingly, this article also made reference to the “anarchist movement”:
Now investigators, who had been looking at extremist groups of all
types in their search for clues, have narrowed their focus to the
anarchist movement, a small and obscure network of intellectuals,
labor organizers and political idealists who share a darkly apocalyptic
view of western civilization. (Noble, 1995c)

The article continued, “No one appears to know how big or far-flung that network
is— Mr. Zerzan himself says he does not know— but Oregon and Northern California,
dotted by a number of anarchist bookstores and reading rooms, are believed to be its
center.” Then this theme completely disappeared.
This article represented a specific acknowledgement that the Unabomber had
an ideology, that he was politically and ideologically motivated, making future non
coverage and discussion of anarchism all the more glaring. Also, though there was
reference to an “anarchist movement,” there was no more discussion of it in The New
York Times or Time, though Kaczynski would not be arrested for another eleven
months.
This next article, which appeared in Time, was the first of a number of articles
in which feature the intersection of ideology and abnormality. Specifically, in this
and other articles, the Unabomber’s ideology, sometimes identified as anarchist,
sometimes not, was taken as evidence o f abnormality. Qualitative coverage of
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Kaczynski with regard to abnormality revealed clear depoliticization and
medicalization. The depoliticization and medicalization to which I refer in this and
following paragraphs seems more blatant, as it is specifically Kaczynski’s ideology
which was depoliticized and medicalized. Penthouse publisher Bob Guccione said
the following regarding the printing of the Unabomber’s article, later known as
“Industrial Society and Its Future” : “I would do it in an instant. This is the
philosophical ramblings of a tortured mind” (Lemonick, 1995). This differs from
other articles, as will become clear, in which Kaczynski’s behavior in court or his
refusal to cooperate with his lawyers was taken as evidence of illness. Here, his very
ideology, usually as expressed in his writing, was taken as evidence of abnormality
and sickness.
When the Unabomber made it known that he would stop sending mail bombs
if his 37,000-word article was published it was front-page news. Though The Times
identified and discussed his ideology he was labeled a “self-described anarchist,”
again revealing their reluctance to accept his actions as politically motivated. Also,
through language and placement his ideology was distorted and marginalized. For
example, his “manifesto” was said to call “for revolution against what he says is a
corrupt industrial technological society controlled by a shadow international elite of
government and corporate figures seeking to subvert human freedom.” This was a
distorted presentation of Kaczynski’s article. The Times’&interpretation reduces it to
a conspiracy theory.
As for placement, the title of the “manifesto,” “Industrial Society and Its
Future,” was not even stated until the last few paragraphs of the article. While the
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document was quoted throughout, some of the most critical quotes were, like the
revelation of the title, left for the end of the article. For example, the first extended
quote was as follows: ‘T o increase our chances of getting our stuff published in
some ‘respectable periodical we have to offer less in exchange for publication in
Penthouse.” That stands in stark contrast to a quote near the article’s end:
The manifesto entitled “Industrial Society and Its Future,” opens with
a basic assertion: ‘T h e Industrial Revolution and its consequences
have been a disaster for the human race.” He is not quoted on his
ultimate goal until the end: “W e therefore advocate a revolution
against the industrial system.” (McFadden, 1995c)

Interestingly, there were no claims that the document was a manifestation of
abnormality on the part of its author. According to The Times, in fact, the article
was:
A 62 page, single-spaced document that often reads like a closely
reasoned scholarly tract, touching on politics, history, sociology and
science as it posits a cataclysmic struggle between freedom and
technology. The document, mixing revolutionary rhetoric and back-to
nature-sentiments in a blend that might have come from Trotsky or
Thoreau... (McFadden, 1995c)

Later, after Kaczynski was apprehended, the same document was reported as a
manifestation of abnormality.
Though Kaczynski’s alleged actions were usually depoliticized, there were
points, as in the qualitative coverage o f his mental state, at which a strong
countervailing tendency was readily identifiable, as in the following two New York
Times articles. Though the Unabomber was described in both as a “self-described
anarchist” he was interpreted as a politically and ideologically motivated actor. Some
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of his ideas were even given credence. On July 4, 1995, The Times reported on a
letter sent by the Unabomber to Tom Tyler, Professor of Social Psychology at the
University of California, Berkeley. According to The Times, Professor Tyler “said
discussion was a ‘much more effective way to bring about change than violence.’”
(McFadden, 1995e). The Unabomber wished to bring about social change. He was a
politically and ideologically motivated actor.
The next day The Times reported: “In an open letter to the serial mail bomber
known as the Unabomber, a professor at the University of California at Berkeley said
that he agreed with some beliefs expressed by the self-described anarchist but that he
strenuously disavowed the bomber’s violent means.” Means to what? To bring about
social change, the goal of a politically motivated actor. The article continued:
The professor said that he agreed that technology created many social
problems and that many people felt they were losing control over their
lives because of technology. “People are developing the type of anti
technology ideology that you advocate in your manuscript.” Mr. Tyler
wrote that the anti-industrial ideas advocated by the bomber would
more likely be embraced if he eschewed violence for education and
other peaceful means to encourage social change. (“Professor asks
bomber,” 1995)

A blatant instance of depoliticization occurred when the Unabomber was
defined as a “hate-fueled obsessive...who uses his ideology as a cover for his will to
dominate,” by John Douglas, an ex-FBI agent who developed the bureau’s serial
killer profiling technique (Elson, 1995).
On August 2, 1995, The New York Times ran an article containing excerpts
from “Industrial Society and Its Future.” The opening paragraph was not an excerpt,
but, written by The Times, framed the article, giving the title of the Unabomber’s
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paper. Nowhere in the article was a specific ideology attributed to the Unabomber,
though in one excerpt Kaczynski actually used the term. In other words, an ideology
was discussed in the article, but it was not identified by The Times as an anarchist,
leftist, or radical environmentalist ideology:
.. .it is necessary to develop and propagate an ideology that opposes
technology and the industrial system. Such an ideology can become
the basis for a revolution against industrial society if and when the
system becomes sufficiently weakened. And such an ideology will
help to assure that, if and when industrial society breaks down, its
remnants will be smashed beyond repair, so that the system cannot be
reconstituted. The factories should be destroyed, technical books
burned etc...U ntil the industrial system has been thoroughly wrecked,
the destruction of that system must be the revolutionaries' ONLY goal.
(“Excerpts from manuscript,” 1995)

The New York Times published an article on the FBI’s search for the
Unabomber among the leftist community in the San Francisco Bay Area in which the
Unabomber’s actions were clearly set in a political context: the words “anarchist,”
“leftist,” and “radical environmentalist” were used. Then, out of seemingly nowhere,
the actions of the Unabomber were depoliticized and medicalized. In an article on
Bay Area radicals a self-described leftist and environmentalist was quoted as saying
the bomber was “sick” (Noble, 1995a).
A month later The New York Times and The Washington Post published
Kaczynski’s article, and it was front-page news in The Times. The Unabomber’s call
“for revolution against the industrial and technological underpinnings of society...”
was reported, the title of the article was identified, and it was described as “closely
reasoned.” The article “ ... touched on politics, history, sociology, science and
particularly the history of science and called for a nonpolitical revolution in which
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factories would be destroyed, books burned and humanity saved from economic and
technological slavery” (McFadden, 1995f). However, as in other articles, no ideology
was attributed to the Unabomber. Again, was he an anarchist? A leftist? A radical
environmentalist? The Times did not say.
In the following article the actions of the Unabomber were depoliticized. We
are told that the authorities were “revising important assumptions” about him.
Specifically, he was no longer said to be a politically motivated actor, though neither
The New York Times nor Time were ever committed to that definition, as the
preceding pages made clear. The article stated:
...the authorities are revising important assumptions about the
background and motives o f the crim inal...interviews with
investigators and academics who are closely following the case
suggest that the 35,000 word manuscript is the work of a man whose
profile more closely fits that of a serial murderer than a domestic
terrorist with a political agenda...The threatening circumstances
surrounding the manuscript, the growing strength of his bombs and a
pattern of erratic behavior this year, including a false threat in June to
blow up a plane, led some criminal profilers on the case to alter their
initial view that the bomber was a terrorist with a political agenda.
Instead, they now regard him as a serial murderer who kills to satisfy
an inner psychological need. (Johnston, 1995a)

This reinterpretation was reiterated in several subsequent articles.
For almost two months there were no articles on the Unabomber. One
appeared January 21, 1996, then, on April 4, Kaczynski was apprehended. O f course
the news made the front-page of The New York Times and the reinterpretation o f the
Unabomber, from politically motivated terrorist to serial killer who is driven by an
inner psychological need, was repeated:
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The manifesto and a false threat in California to blow up a plane, both
of which seemed uncharacteristically erratic, prompted some criminal
profilers to alter their view of the bomber. They now saw him not as a
disciplined terrorist with a political aim but as a driven serial killer
whose bombs fulfilled a psychological need. (Johnston, 1996)

On June 22, The New York Times ran an article under the headline “Plot
Against Long Island Leaders is Tied to Fear of UFO’s.” In this article the
Unabomber’s ideas were described as “bizarre” and put in the context of UFO’s.
Unlike many previous articles, specific reference was made to his writing in applying
this label. Whereas The Times earlier on had called the manuscript “a closely
reasoned tract,” it was now presented as evidence that Kaczynski was a “kook” or a
“far out”. The article is quoted below:
Fearing that space aliens had crashed on Long Island and that the
authorities were covering it up, three members of a UFO group plotted
to assassinate Suffolk County officials with radioactive materials and
seize control of county government, prosecutors said today. “Yes, this
all sounds way out,” District Attorney James M. Catterson said. “But
when I read the Unabomber Manifesto some of his ideas were just as
bizarre.” (McQuiston, 1996)

Clearly Kaczynski was marginalized and depoliticized.
In November of 1997 The Times quoted David Kaczynski’s lawyer, who made
specific reference to Kaczynski’s writing in depoliticizing him and casting him as
mentally ill:
In his correspondence, Ted projects his own feelings of anger,
depression and powerlessness onto society at large...H e blames these
ill effects on a wide variety of external factors, including childhood
classmates, teachers and his family as well as the media, chemical and
electronic mind control, education, science and technology. (Jackson,
1997b)
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The dynamic was repeated six days later, when The Times reported David
Kaczynski’s claim that Federal agents “working on the case told him before his
brother was arrested in 1996 that reading the Unabomber’s lengthy manifesto on why
he felt compelled to carry out the bombings had convinced them that they were not
dealing with a political terrorist but with a disturbed individual (Glaberson, 1997a).
Kaczynski was obviously depoliticized and medicalized, and it was done with
specific reference to his writing.
For the new year, The New York Times reported old news, repeating David
Kaczynski’s claims “ ...that prosecutors had led him to believe in the early phases of
the investigation that they understood his brother was not a political terrorist but a
troubled man who should receive psychiatric help in prison” (Glaberson, 1998e).
On January 12, specific reference was again made, in a Time article, to
Kaczynski’s writings in labeling him “nuts.” According to a “high ranking Justice
Department official” : “’This man is a cold-blooded killer. Read his writing. Any
serial killer is nuts.’” (Jackson, 1998a). Clearly, this article depoliticized and
medicalized Kaczynski: his writing was taken as a manifestation o f illness. He was
not a politically and ideologically motivated actor.
The following New York Times editorial by James Q. W ilson forcefully
attempted to pull Kaczynski back into a political context, representing the tension,
displayed throughout, between those who cast the alleged actions of Kaczynski as
politically and ideologically motivated and those who claim his actions were simply a
manifestation of abnormality and mental illness.
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Wilson put Kaczynski in a political context, and “Industrial Society and Its
Future” was taken to be anything but a manifestation of illness. Actually, Wilson’s
position was close to The New York Times's early assertions that the paper was
“closely reasoned” and “scholarly.” He called it “ .. .a carefully reasoned, artfully
written paper.” Furthermore, Wilson linked Kaczynski to such thinkers as Rousseau
and Marx, forcefully rejecting claims that “Industrial Society and Its Future” was a
manifestation of mental illness:
There is nothing in the manifesto that looks at all like the work of a
madman. The language is clear, precise and calm. The argument is
subtle and carefully developed, lacking anything even faintly
resembling the wild claims or irrational speculation that a lunatic
might produce. If it is the work of a madman, then the writings of
many political philosophers— Jean Jacques Rousseau, Tom Paine, Karl
Marx— are scarcely more sane. (Wilson, 1998)

Four days later Time again defined Kaczynski’s writing as a manifestation of
illness, going so far as to claim that its thoroughness was explained by illness. He
was depoliticized and medicalized. David Kaczynski’s lawyer:
“Part of Ted’s affliction is the inability to stop analyzing,” says
Kaczynski family attorney Bisceglie. “If you go back to the letters and
the manifesto, you will see this analysis and re-analysis and analyses
of analyses and endless drawing of distinctions and of footnotes. It’s
almost as if he has no off switch. He isn’t in control.” (Jackson,
1998b)

Two days later we read that court-appointed psychiatrist Dr. Sally Johnson’s
has officially applied the mental illness label to Kaczynski in the form of paranoid
schizophrenia, but she also pronounced him competent to stand trial. “The Unabom
campaign” was blamed on mental illness. The alleged actions of Kaczynski were said
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to have been caused by mental illness rather than political motivation, thereby
depoiiticizing and medicalizing Theodore Kaczynski. The New York Times:
The lawyer who read Dr. Johnson’s report said it suggested a direct
link between Mr. Kaczynski’s mental illness and the Unabom
campaign. “Consistent with other individuals with persecutory types
of delusions,’’ said a report excerpt provided by the lawyer, “he is
resentful and angry and fantasizes and actually does resort to violence
against those individuals and organizations that he believes are hurting
him. (Glaberson, 1998c)

On January 23, 1998, The New York Times reported on its front page that
Kaczynski avoided a death sentence by pleading guilty. As in many previous articles,
a specific ideology is not attributed to Kaczynski and very little was said regarding
“the Unabomb campaign,” which was simply described as “ ... a solitary 18-year
campaign aimed at bringing down the technological system.” (Glaberson, 1998d).
Theodore Kaczynski was certainly not presented as a politically motivated actor, and
the use of “solitary” is interesting, marginalizing him in two ways. First, “solitary”
may simply depoliticize, as in, ‘T h is guy was acting alone. He was not part of a
larger political movement.” Second, “solitary” may medicalize, as in, ‘T his guy is
crazy in thinking that the world system can be brought down by one man.”
Kaczynski’s brother David was allowed to specifically attribute the actions of
his brother to mental illness one last time, depoiiticizing and medicalizing as
throughout: ‘T o David, his brother remains a person with a core of humanity whose
horrible acts were caused by psychosis. ‘I think what we have seen from Ted is still a
manifestation of his illness’”(Glaberson, 1998b).
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Time's coverage wrapped up February 2, 1998, with the article “Crazy is as
Crazy Does: Why the Unabomber Agreed to Trade a Guilty Plea for a Life Sentence.”
By this time discussion of the possible political dimensions and motivations of the
case had been reduced to a trickle. This article simply stated that Kaczynski had
wanted to use a necessity defense to explain “his 18-year killing spree— aimed mainly
at those he considered technocrats, like computer scientist and business executives”
by arguing that it “ ...w as necessary to save an environment-despoiling America from
itself’ (Edwards, 1998). But Time repeated and accepted the claims of Dr. Johnson
that Kaczynski was a delusional paranoid schizophrenic. Theodore J. Kaczynski, the
Unabomer, “the self styled scourge of society” was “mentally ill.” He has been
medicalized and depoliticized.
Finally, The New York Times coverage ended with publication of Kaczynski’s
personal journal entries, which were selectively released by the prosecution in order
to convey the impression that he was a sane, rational killer, but not politically and
ideologically motivated. The following quote from one of Kaczynski’s journals,
dated April 6, 1971, was presented: “My motive for doing what I am going to do is
simply personal revenge. I do not expect to accomplish anything by it. O f course, if
my crime gets any public attention, it may help to stimulate public interest in the
technology question ...’’(“Excerpts from Unabomber’s,” 1998).

Qualitative Findings: McVeigh, “Ideology”
In contrast to Kaczynski, McVeigh was consistently defined as a politically
and ideologically motivated actor. The New York Times first mentioned McVeigh on
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April 22, 1995. In this first front page article, the destruction of the Murrah Federal
Building was placed in a right-wing context: “ The date, as the fiery end of the
Federal siege o f the Branch Davidian compound, had become a defining moment and
rallying cry for scores of armed right-wing paramilitary groups.” The bombing of the
Murrah Federal Building was understood to be a politically inspired act, driven by
right-wing ideology. More specifically, McVeigh and the right were also motivated
by anger over Waco. In this initial article The New York Times laid out the
grievances of the militias: they oppose gun control, taxes, The United Nations, and
the “New W orld Order” (McFadden, 1995b). Other articles that appeared April 22
echoed these themes, as they would throughout The New York Times's and Time's
coverage of McVeigh.
We learned more about McVeigh on the front page of The New York Times
the following day, April 23, 1995. According to The Times he was involved in
... a far right world of tax-protesters and anti-government activists,
and finally into a deep sympathy with the Branch Davidians who died
in a fire that followed a siege by Federal agents near Waco, Texas in
1993. He visited Waco, acquaintances said, and went away with deepseated anger and resentment against the Federal Government.
(McFadden, 1995d)

In this next passage, McVeigh’s “far-right political views” were cited as a motivating
factor in his alleged crime: “Federal officials say his far-right political views, his
anger and his taste for weapons merged last M onday...”
This next article focused not on the wider right wing but on McVeigh’s
ideology specifically. The opening paragraph stated, “In a letter to the editor of a
newspaper in upstate New York in 1992, the Oklahoma City bombing suspect
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suggested that violence might be the only way to change things.” The article
continued, quoting McVeigh: “’What is it going to take to open the eyes of our
elected officials?’ the suspect, Timothy J. McVeigh, wrote in The Union-Sun and
Journal of Lockport, N. Y. ‘Do we have to shed blood to reform the current system? I
hope it doesn’t come to that. But it m ight’” (Barron, 1995a).
The Times clearly situated McVeigh in a political context in the following
article, in which a lawyer known for representing leftists is asked if he would
represent McVeigh. He said “no,” then The Times asked, “And if the accused
bomber were from the political left? Mr. Kuby said he did not believe that those on
the American left have committed or would intentionally commit a similar crime”
(Applebome, 1995).
Clearly, McVeigh was understood as a politically motivated actor.
Furthermore, in this next passage his case was further solidified as a political one
when his trial was compared to that of Sacco and Vanzetti, an irony given that they
were anarchists. According to The Times-.
Charles Wolfram, a professor at Cornell University Law School said
that despite public animus toward Mr. McVeigh, the level of judicial
fairness in such cases now is much higher than in earlier eras. He
cited, for example, the prosecution of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo
Vanzetti, Italian-born anarchists accused of a 1920 murder and
executed seven years later. (Applebome, 1995)

Finally, McVeigh was put in the context of Adolf Hitler and Adolf Eichmann:
“I’ve said to many people, the acid test of a criminal defense lawyer is could you
represent H itler or Adolph Eichmann?” Reviled figures indeed, but like Sacco and
Vanzetti, political figures.
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At this point Time began to comment. On May 1, 1995, the cover story
focused on the blast at the Murrah Building, paying attention to McVeigh. His alleged
actions were situated as politically motivated. Time gave us a long list of militia
grievances, then highlighted “the movements twin tragedies,” one of them being
Waco. Time followed the pattern established by The New York Times: McVeigh’s
alleged actions were cast as politically and ideologically motivated and he was
located within the context of a wider right wing movement (Gleick, 1995b).
On May 2, 1995, The New York Times reported, “President Clinton said today
that Americans should resist the idea that the bombing in Oklahoma City was a
political act, an argument that some right-wing paramilitary groups have advanced”
(Johnston, 1995b). Yet both The New York Times and Time presented the Oklahoma
City bombing as a political act by using terms like “ideology,” by putting McVeigh in
the context of Hitler, Eichmann, and Sacco and Vanzaetti, and by repeating details
about Waco and stressing it as a motivating factor.
An interesting article appeared in The New York Times May 11, in which
McVeigh was said to have been motivated by “a philosophy broader than Waco”
(Belluck, 1995b). McVeigh was clearly presented as someone motivated by
ideology. The Oklahoma City bombing was presented as a political crime.
The Oklahoma City bombing was also situated as a political act on the front
page of The New York Times on May 28, 1995, in which letters written by McVeigh
to his hometown newspaper were presented as giving insight into his political
motivation (Rimer, 1995). Interestingly, when Kaczynski’s writing was analyzed it
was said to reveal, and actually be evidence of, abnormality and mental illness.
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On June 26, The New York Times made reference to McVeigh’s “political
views” (Belluck, 1995c) and in a front-page article which appeared in July of 1995
specific reference was made to “McVeigh’s political anger,” and he was located
within a larger right-wing movement (Kifner, 1995a). A “political philosophy” was
attributed to McVeigh. (Weiner, 1995a). Finally, The Times identified McVeigh’s
“search for ideological converts” (Kifner, 1995b). In all of these articles McVeigh
was defined as a politically and ideologically motivated actor.
Two years after the bombing The New York Times took the opportunity to
“look back,” and in the process repeated the idea of Waco as a specific motivating
factor in the destruction of the Murrah Building. McVeigh was motivated by
ideology, and for him, the proof of that ideology came in the form of Waco, which
“enraged the chief bombing suspect in the Oklahoma bombing, Timothy J. McVeigh,
and spurred him into what he is said to have envisioned as an act of retaliation against
the government (Verhovek, 1997).
In June 1997, McVeigh was convicted of blowing up the Murrah Federal
Building. He was still presented as being politically motivated, and was placed in the
context of, and linked to, a wider right-wing/militia movement (Thomas, 1997b).
An interesting article appeared in The Times on June 3, 1997, in which
speculation was offered as to why the trial was not followed closely by the nation.
Why were we not riveted as we were in the O.J. case? Obviously, the trial was not
televised, but, according to The Times, there was another factor: “And anyway, the
weight of all those people killed—all those children— by a bomber in the service of
ideology was too heavy” (Goodman, 1997). As was the case throughout, both The
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New York Times and Time, presented McVeigh’s actions as politically motivated and
his case was placed in a political context.
The pattern continued: McVeigh, now convicted of blowing up the Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, was still presented as an ideologically and
politically motivated actor. The New York Times presented McVeigh in this light, not
only in the text of articles, but in headlines as well: “Political Ideas O f McVeigh Are
Subject At Bomb Trial” (Thomas, L997d).
Finally, The Times offered their final editorial statement on the issue, casting
McVeigh as ideologically driven and part of a larger right wing or militia movement.
Timothy McVeigh was presented as a political actor: “ ...m ilitia ideology has already
provoked the Oklahoma City bom bing...” (‘T h e militia threat,” 1997).
Predictably, Time also continued to portray McVeigh as politically motivated,
casting him as a would-be revolutionary:
He spends most of his time in jail reading the piles of mail he receives.
He also reads books. Last month it was Somerset M augham’s The
Razor's Edge, and he is now finishing M an's Fate by Andre Malraux.
A book about a young m an’s spiritual quest and one about
revolutionaries— McVeigh must be taking both seriously. (Collins,
1997)

In this chapter I have provided quantitative and qualitative analysis showing
that Ted Kaczynski was more likely than Tim McVeigh to have been defined as
abnormal. In other words Kaczynski’s acts were more likely to have been attributed
to abnormality than those of Tim McVeigh. Second, The New York Times and Time
were more likely to attribute an ideology to Tim McVeigh than Ted Kaczynski. In
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other words, McVeigh’s acts were more likely than those of Kaczynski to have been
attributed to political and ideological motivation.
Interestingly, qualitative analysis revealed that at points in the coverage strong
claims were put forth asserting Kaczynski to be both normal and politically and
ideologically motivated. At other points, however, he was defined as abnormal even
when a political ideology was attributed to him.
As for McVeigh, qualitative analysis revealed that at many points during the
coverage his normalcy might reasonably have been raised but was not. Furthermore,
even when he was defined as abnormal, his abnormalities were often cast as, or
placed in the context of, political abnormalities.
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION

I now return to the initial concerns, aims, and questions that guided this
research. My specific empirical aim in this investigation of the intersection of mass
media and medicalization was to assess whether or not mainstream media
presentations displayed a double standard in the use and application of medical
terminology as an explanation of the actions of Ted Kaczynski and Tim McVeigh: To
what did the media attribute the actions of Kaczynski and McVeigh? Were the
actions of one more likely to be attributed to political and ideological motivation?
Were the actions of one more likely to be attributed to psychological abnormality?
To answer these questions I performed quantitative and qualitative content
analysis of The New York Times's and Time's coverage of Ted Kaczynski, otherwise
known as the Unabomber, convicted of sending mail bombs to leading technocrats in
a 17-year anti-technology campaign, killing 3 and injuring 17, and Tim McVeigh,
convicted of killing 168 people in the destruction of the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, asking two more specific questions of the data in each
article: First, did the article attribute a political ideology to the actor in question?
Second, did the article define the actor in question as abnormal?
In the previous chapter I have provided empirical evidence, both quantitative
and qualitative, showing that: (1) The New York Times and Time were more likely to
attribute the acts of McVeigh to political and ideological motivation; and (2) The New
York Times and Time were more likely to attribute Kaczynski’s acts to psychological
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abnormality. In short, I have provided evidence of the media’s double standard in the
use and application of medical terminology in explaining the acts of Ted Kaczynski
and Tim McVeigh: The destruction of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, undertaken by a rightist, was more likely to be attributed to political
and ideological motivation, while ‘T he Unabomber campaign,” undertaken by an
anarchist, was more likely to be attributed to psychological abnormality and mental
illness. McVeigh’s acts were willful, Kaczynski’s were not.
In this final chapter I: (1) turn to a discussion of the significance and meaning
of mass media medicalization of the Unabomber, focusing on the implications of the
media’s double standard in the use and application of medical terminology as an
explanation of the acts of McVeigh and Kaczynski; (2) identify and address two
shortcomings or limitations of this study; and (3) suggest a future line of inquiry with
regard to the intersection of mass media and medicalization.
The main implications of the media’s uneven application o f medical
terminology as an explanation of the actions of Kaczynski and McVeigh lies in social
control. The media play a powerful role in modem American society by shaping
public perception. Much of what we think we know about the world comes from the
media. In short, it plays a large role in the construction of reality for most people.
The media have the power to frame and define, and as such are one of the most
powerful social control agents in this society.
What is social control? According to Conrad and Schneider, the conflict
perspective “defines social control as a political mechanism by which certain groups
can dominate others” (1980, p. 21). Speaking more specifically, they identify

87

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

medical social control as “the acceptance of a medical perspective as the dominant
definition of a certain phenomenon” (p. 242). More specific still, they identify a
specific type of social control, “medical ideology,” which involves defining a
behavior or condition as an illness primarily because of the social and ideological
benefits accrued by conceptualizing it in medical terms” (p. 245). They make it clear
that “disease designations can support dominant social interests and institutions” (p.
245).
For example, as mentioned earlier, the medicalization of runaway slaves
through the application of the disease diagnosis “draptomania,” as well as the labeling
of Soviet dissidents as schizophrenics served the interests of dominant elites of those
respective societies. Though both represent extreme and seemingly obvious uses of
medicalization in the service of ideology and the status quo, the case of Kaczynski is
more subtle, yet he represented a definite ideological and symbolic threat to dominant
interests, including owners of commercial mass media organizations such as The New
York Times and Time, whereas McVeigh’s “critique” was confined to criticizing the
Federal Government. Though he committed violent acts, McVeigh was not a
revolutionary: he did not critique commercial interests, capitalism, or technology, and
was presented by the commercial mass media as a politically and ideologically
motivated actor. The system was able to deal with his critique. Kaczynski’s critique,
by contrast, focused on industrialization and technology. His critique was truly
revolutionary. As such, the system could not handle it. He critiqued commercial
interests and those commercial interests attributed his criminal actions to
psychological abnormality. The commercial media allow critique of the Federal
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Government, but not the whole of industrial society. In other words, McVeigh’s
critique was not a real threat to vested interests; Kaczynski’s was.
The medicalization of Kaczynski served a social control function in that his
actions were not held out to the public as examples of politically motivated behavior
from which people can draw. The ideas of Ted Kaczynski could serve as a cognitive
tool or resource people who wish to bring about social change might draw upon. If
he is categorized as psychologically abnormal or ill his comments are no longer
worthy o f consideration. He is neutralized. Mass media and the medicalization of
deviance merge in the case of Ted Kaczynski, serving social control processes most
generally as well as medical ideology specifically.
Thus, one of the main implications of uneven media coverage with regard to
McVeigh and Kaczynski is that the status quo was upheld and reinforced. Conrad has
identified medicine as “a de facto agent of the status quo” (1987, p. 67). With regard
to this dissertation, however, mass media use of medical language and vocabulary
served the social control function of upholding the status quo or distribution of power
and resources rather than the medical profession itself, which was only marginally
involved. Thus, the medicalization of Ted Kaczynski took place on what Conrad has
identified as the conceptual level, wherein a medical vocabulary or model is used to
define and make sense o f the problem, condition, or act in question. When
medicalization occurs on this level, medical professionals may be only marginally
involved and medical treatments may not be used (1992, p.211). This level of
medicalization is most applicable to the present research, in which The New York
Times and Time were more likely to use a medical vocabulary to define and describe
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Kaczynski than McVeigh, and medical professionals such as psychiatrists were
marginally involved. That is, rather than reporting the claims of psychiatrists or other
medical professions, media themselves applied medical labels, which is a testament to
their power. They defined the situation.
Talking specifically about medicalization, Conrad and Schneider say, ‘T he
greatest social control power comes from having the authority to define certain
behaviors, persons, and things” (Conrad & Schneider, 1980, p. 8). This case
represents the intersection of mass media and the medicalization and depoliticization
of deviant behavior. The media, already an institution with the power to frame and
define reality, also used the authority of medical language and terminology to
medicalize, marginalize, and depoliticize Ted Kaczynski. As Conrad said, ‘‘the key
issue is definitional” (1992, p. 216). Steen takes this statement a bit further in saying
that ‘T h e definition that comes to prevail, be it a legal, moral, political, or medical
definition, determines in large part how society will view the individuals engaging in
problem behaviors” (2001, p.327). Finally, Szasz adds a point most germane to this
dissertation when he says that to “classify another person’s behavior is usually a
means of constraining him” (1970, p. 213). O f course some classifications or labels
are more constraining than others. While Tim McVeigh was defined as a criminal,
political ideology and motivation were generally attributed to him, whereas Ted
Kaczynski’s medicalized label was constraining in that it served to depoliticize and
neutralize his critique of modem industrial society.
When an action or behavior is medicalized, other possible social sources,
explanations, and causes are downplayed or ignored altogether. For example, Carrier
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argues that learning disability theory “misrecognizes and thus masks the effects of
social practices and hierarchy,” thus serving not only to obfuscate, but to deflect
attention from issues of power and privilege, thereby reinforcing the status quo (1983,
p. 952). This dynamic has been identified in regard to other problems as well
(Conrad 1992, p. 224), such as battering, thereby deflecting attention from issues of
patriarchy and social inequality.
Just as other explanations for the behavior or action in question are ruled out,
so too is will and motivation. When behavior is interpreted as being caused by
illness the social actor is stripped of his or her capacity to act with will or motivation.
When Ted Kaczynski is said to be “sick,” “crazy,” or “schizophrenic,” he is relieved
of his agency, precluding the possibility that his actions, though illegal and opposed
by most, were the result of deliberate political protest, “an intentional repudiation of
existing political arrangements” (Conrad 1992, p. 251). Timothy McVeigh, however,
despite being responsible for far more death and destruction, was granted agency by
the media.
Another aspect of media coverage that resulted in the medicalizaton of Ted
Kaczynski, with implications for social control, involves the media’s use of medical
terminology and the medical model. According to Conrad and Schneider, the
“medical model and the associated medical designations are assumed to have a
scientific basis and are treated as if they are morally neutral (1980, p. 35). In other
words these judgments are assumed to be objective, value-free, rational and scientific
diagnoses rather than political or moral judgements. Again, such notions serve a
social control function by masking the inherently political nature of the definitional
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process. More specifically, Conrad and Schneider point out that “medical
designations are social judgments and the adoption of a medical model of behavior is
a political decision (1980, p. 35). The political nature of medical designations is
covered over by the assumed objectivity of the medical model. The result, according
to Conrad and Schneider, of interpreting criminal acts in medical terms “is to
depoliticize and remove moral judgment from the behavior in question. Much as the
label “crime” allows no attention to the social environment, “sickness” removes the
offending act and actor even farther from any political and ethical context” (1980, p.
222). In other words, the act, person, or condition is depoliticized and what might
otherwise be understood as political protest is neutralized.
Reynolds has written perceptively on the social consequences of
medicalization and depoliticization. It
...results in the withdrawal of more and more areas of human
experience from the realm of public discussion. For when
drunkenness, juvenile delinquency, sub par performance and extreme
political beliefs are seen as symptoms of an underlying illness or
biological defect the merits and drawbacks of such behavior or beliefs
need not be evaluated. (1973, pp. 200-221)

In other words, public discourse about important social issues and problems,
such as environmental destruction and the role of technology in modem industrial
society, both major concerns of Ted Kaczynski’s, is downplayed and ignored.
As was demonstrated in my findings chapter, both The New York Times and
Time were more likely to medicalize the actions of Ted Kaczynski than Tim
McVeigh, leading me to refer to “the medicalization of Ted Kaczynski.” As Conrad
points out, however, the process of medicalization is rarely complete and should
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properly be thought o f as occurring on a continuum in which we think of
medicalization not as an either-or, dichotomous process, but as a process which can
be thought of in degrees. Hence, Conrad utilizes the notion of “degrees of
medicaliztion” (1992, p. 220).
Though he notes that we lack a clear understanding of the factors that impact
degrees of medicalization, it is clear that the existence of competing definitions is a
crucial factor. Throughout the qualitative portion of this dissertation these dynamics
were clearly played out. Though Kaczynski was more likely to be medicalized than
McVeigh, his medicalization was not complete, as was noted at various points. More
than once specific claims rejecting the medicalization of Kaczynski and asserting him
to be a politically and ideologically motivated actor were put forth. These competing
definitions appeared at various points in the coverage of Kaczynski.
It would seem that the more fully medicalized a condition or behavior
becomes the greater the potential social control. For instance, if Kaczynski were
completely medicalized there would be no claims challenging a medicalized
definition of his actions; there would be no claims asserting him to be a politically
and ideologically motivated actor, effectively sealing off and confining public
understanding of the case to the medical realm. The public’s perception and
understanding is thus shaped and controlled, precluding the use of Kaczynski and his
actions as a model or cognitive resource for others who desire radical social
transformation. The political spectrum is thus narrowed.
I now return to Herman and Chomsky’s notion of “dichotomous coverage.”
As noted earlier, though they most fully apply this idea to coverage of international
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events, they have found it useful in understanding media presentation of domestic
events as well. However, it has not been used to understand coverage of individuals
who claim to have committed domestic political crimes, but who represent different
ideologies.
Does their idea aid our understanding of media coverage of Timothy
McVeigh and Ted Kaczynski? Broadly speaking, the concept of dichotomous
coverage seems to explain the coverage fairly well. The thrust of their work relies on
the idea of dichotomous media coverage, whereby broadly similar situations or
individuals are covered differently based upon their relation to elite commercial
interests. Their work anticipates the general dynamics I have presented throughout
this dissertation: violent political protest from the right has been accepted as
politically and ideologically motivated, while violent political protest from the left
has been marginalized. Cases broadly similar except for the respective ideologies
claimed by McVeigh and Kaczynski, gamer different media coverage. The New York
Times and Time treated McVeigh and Kaczynski differently. This bears out
empirically.
But the present research built on their perspective in two ways. First, as I
stressed throughout my qualitative analysis, though Kaczynski was more likely to be
medicalized than McVeigh, coverage was far from monolithic. Throughout the
coverage of both McVeigh and Kaczynski, but especially Kaczynski, competing
definitions of their behavior were to be found. As pointed out earlier in reference to
Conrad’s notion o f “degrees of medicalization,” the medicalization of Kaczynski was
not complete. Possible public understanding of Kaczynski as a politically and
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ideologically motivated actor was not completely sealed off. Kellner (1990) has
critiqued Herman and Chomsky’s work, opting instead for a hegemonic conception,
which takes into account media presentations and definitions that challenge
established and accepted interests. In light of the qualitative analysis presented in this
dissertation, K ellner’s point is instructive.
Second, and more importantly, I wed their work to Conrad and Schneider’s
concept, medicalization. That is, Herman and Chomsky do not identify or discuss the
intersection o f the mass media and the medicalization and depoliticization of deviant
behavior.

Issues
At this juncture it is necessary to address two issues and limitations of this
dissertation. First, the media output with regard to the two cases was very large. As
mentioned at several points, SOI articles were included for analysis. It comes as no
surprise, then, that 501 articles resulted in a small mountain of qualitative notes,
which then had to be organized and boiled down. Reading, sorting, coding, and
analyzing the data challenged my organizational skills. There were logistical
problems. Keeping detailed notes and being generally organized were difficult.
Obviously, researchers conducting all such projects face issues such as these: How
will the notes be organized? What will be included? What must be cut? These
issues were simply magnified with respect to this dissertation.
Second, the coding of articles in terms of the “abnormal” category was
problematic. With the category of “ideology” it was easy to code articles. Very few
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words, such as “ left,” “right,” “anarchist,” and “patriot,” as well as variations of
these, were indicators that an ideology was being attributed to either McVeigh or
Kaczynski in a particular article. As mentioned earlier, this reduced my task to an
essentially clerical one. One or more of the words was present in a particular article
or it was not. With the “abnormal” category, however, deciding whether or not a
particular article defined its subject as abnormal was more difficult to define, making
my coding task a bit more difficult. Many words or phrases can be used to describe a
person as abnormal, so constructing a pre-determined word list was simply
impractical. Thus, I had to assess each article on an individual basis, letting the data
emerge throughout the entire project rather than the first 25 articles only, as was the
case with the category “ideology.”

Future Research
The McVeigh and Kaczynski cases provided an interesting opportunity to wed
two distinct lines of inquiry: the mass media research of Herman and Chomsky and
Conrad and Schneider’s concept, medicalization, the process whereby conditions,
behaviors, and actions come to be attributed to illness, paying special attention to the
media’s use and application of medical terminology. In other words, I have grounded
the marriage o f these research lines in empirical data by comparing The New York
Times's and Time's presentations of McVeigh and Kaczynski. This dissertation thus
stands at the intersection of mass media and medicalization. Prior to this project no
systematic research had been undertaken which took as its focus the role of the mass
media in processes of medicalization and depoliticization. More specifically, no
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researchers had compared media coverage of two individuals who claimed to commit
politically and ideologically motivated crimes in the service of different ideologies,
paying close attention to the media's use and application of medical terminology in
explaining those crimes.
In what directions might future resesarch go? Bagdikian (1992) as well as
Herman and Chomsky have provided evidence of the increasing concentration of the
mass media, under which fewer and fewer media corporations provide news and
information for ever-larger numbers of people. In addition, the cultural significance
of the mass media and their presentations continues to expand. These factors
combine with the power of the medical model and medicalization, which, as noted
earlier, has become one of the most powerful modes of social control. As such, future
research should take this intersection as a point of departure.
For example, one project might maintain Herman and Chomsky’s notion of
“dichotomous coverage” and the notion of medicalization, assessing their utility in
understanding media presentations of less commercialized systems. At least one
critic has questioned the applicability of Herman and Chomsky’s ideas to European
mass media (Goodwin, 1994).

Is it possible that the media’s double standard in

using and applying medical terminology takes its shape because it is so different from
communication systems of European democracies, for instance? To what extent can
the distortion, which my research has documented, be understood as an outcome of
the particulars of the American commercial system? It would be interesting to
compare American media coverage of Kaczynski to European coverage. Were his
actions more likely to be attributed to political and ideological motivation or was he
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still likely to be medicalized? If European media presentations of Kaczynski were
less likely to attribute his actions to abnormality, portraying him instead as an
ideologically and politically motivated actor, this would be significant, raising social
control issues once again. Did the European media present Kaczynski as a politically
and ideologically motivated actor while the U.S. media attributed his actions to
abnormality and mental illness?
Much more generally, research should continue to focus on the intersection of
mass media and medicalization: those interested in general medicalization processes
could benefit from paying specific attention to mass media issues and presentations,
while mass media researchers could benefit from paying increased attention to
medicalization processes, generally, and the media’s use and application of medical
terminology specifically.
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Appendix
Words and phrases used by The New York Times and Time
in defining Kaczynski and McVeigh as “abnormal”
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Words and phrases used by The New York Times and Time
in defining Kaczynski and McVeigh as “abnormal”
Kaczynski
methodical madman

mental illness

delusional

tortured mind

mentally ill

psychosis

hate-fueled obsessive

paranoid schizophrenic

sociopath

pathological alienation

mental defect defense

paranoid

monster from the Id

maniacal

crazy

twisted

mental problems

sick

madman

mad genius

unbalanced

pathologically shy

brilliant sociopath

disturbed

demented

psychological demons

nuts

personality pushed over the edge

striking out at demons

kook

kills to satisfy inner psychological need

McVeigh
pathological hatred

bizarre

human madness

obsessed

crazed

mind snapped

unstable

sick

kook

he went crazy

psychotic

paranoid

deteriorated mentally

fanatic

nuts

abnormal (love of guns)

psychological deterioration

100

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

REFERENCES

A twisted rage. (1995, April 24). The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from
LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Altheide, D. (1996). Qualitative media analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Applebome, P. (1995, April 28). The pariah as client: bombing case rekindles debate
for lawyers. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Bagdikian, B.H. (1992). The media monopoly. Boston: Beacon Press.
Barron, J. (1995a, April 27). A ’92 letter says violence is road to change. The
New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Barron, J. (1995b, April 26). Serial bomber sent letters before package blast. The
New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Belluck, P. (1995a, May 19). Evidence cited to hold bombing suspect. The New York
Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Belluck, P. (1995b, May 11). McVeigh said to play role in seeking holes in
government’s case. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXISNEXIS database.
Belluck, P. (1995c, June 26). McVeigh says he’ll plead not guilty. The New York
Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Bloch, S., & Reddaway, P. (1977). Psychiatric terror. New York: Basic Books.

101

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Bloch, S., & Reddaway, P. (1985). Psychiatrists and dissenters in the Soviet Union.
In E. Stover & E. Nightingale (Eds.), The breaking o f bodies and minds:
Torture, Psychiatric abuse, and the health professions (pp. 132-163). New
York: Freeman.
Bly, R. (1996, April 22). Robert Bly on the mind of the Unabomber suspect. Time.
Retrieved May 2001, from InfoTrac database.
Brooke, J. (1997, March 1). Newspaper says McVeigh described role in bombing.
The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Carpiano, R.(2001). Passive medicalization: The case of Viagra and erectile
dysfunction. Sociological Spectrum, 21, 441-450.
Carrier, J.G. (1983). Masking the social in educational knowledge: the case of
learning Disability theory. American Journal o f Sociology, 88,948-974.
Chua-Eoan, H. (1997, March 10). They said he said...; did Timothy McVeigh
confess to the Oklahoma City bombing? Time. Retrieved May 2001, from
InfoTrac database.
Collins, J. (1997, June 16). Day of reckoning: the jury that found McVeigh guilty
wrestles with emotion and tears as it prepared to decide his fate. Time.
Retrieved May 2001, from InfoTrac database.
Conrad, P. (1987). The medicalization of deviance in American culture. In E.
Rubington & M.S. Weinberg (Eds.), Deviance: The interactionist perspective
(pp. 62-68). New York: Macmillan.

102

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Conrad, P. (1992). Medicalization and social control. Annual Review o f Sociology,
18, 209-232.
Conrad, P., & Schneider, J. (1980). Deviance and Medicalization: From badness to
sickness. St. Louis: Mosby.
Conrad, P., & Schneider, J. (1992). Deviance and medicalization: From badness to
sickness. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Death or life? (1997, June 16). Time. Retrieved May 2001, from InfoTrac database.
Edwards, T. (1998, February 2). Crazy is as crazy does: why the Unabomber agreed
to trade a guilty plea for a life sentence. Time. Retrieved May 2001, from
InfoTrac database.
Elson, J. (1995, July 10). Murderer’s manifesto: Threatening more attacks,
Unabomber Issues a screed against technology. Time. Retrieved May 2001,
from InfoTrac database.
Excerpts from letter by “terrorist group,” fc, which says it sent bombs. (1995, April
26). The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Excerpts from manuscript linked to suspect in 17-year series of bombings. (1995,
August 2). The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Excerpts from Unabomber’s journal. (1998, April 29). The New York Times.
Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Gabriel, T. (1996, April 21). Popular culture sets sights on Unabomber. The New
York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.

103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Gibbs, N. (1996, April 15). Tracking down the Unabomber. Time. Retrieved May
2001, from InfoTrac database.
Glaberson, W. (1997a, November 23). Brother asserts prosecutors misled him in
Unabom case. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXISNEXIS database.
Glaberson, W. (1997b, November 21). Unabom Judge to address evidence. The New
York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Glaberson, W. (1998a, January 16). Assault on Unabom defense cites defendant’s
wishes. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Glaberson, W. (1998b, January 24). Evil, or sick, to his core: two views of
Unabomber. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Glaberson, W. (1998c, January 23). Kaczynski avoids a death sentence with guilty
plea.

The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS -NEXIS

database.
Glaberson, W. (1998d, January 21). Lawyers for Kaczynski agree he is competent to
stand Trial. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Glaberson, W. (1998e, January 4). Unabom suspect’s brother troubled by rejection of
plea. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Gleick, E. (1994, December 26). A serial bomber strikes again. Time. Retrieved

104

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

May 2001, from InfoTrac database.
Gleick, E. (1995a, May 8). Something big is going to happen. Time. Retrieved May
2001, from InfoTrac database
Gleick, E. (1995b, May 1). Who are they? Time. Retrieved May 2001, from
InfoTrac database.
Goodwin, J. (1994). What’s right (and wrong) about left media criticism? Herman
and Chomsky’s propaganda model. Sociological Forum, 9, 101-111.
Goodman, W. (1997, June 3). A drama that was hardly made for television struck
deeply all the same. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXISNEXIS database.
Hall, S. (1982). The whites o f their eyes: Racist ideologies and the media. In G.
Bridges and R. Brunt (Eds.), Silver Linings: Some Strategies fo r the Eighties.
London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Hasselbach, I. (1995, April 25). Extremism: a global network. The New York Times.
Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Herman, E. (1996). The propaganda model revisited. Monthly Review, July-August,
115-128.
Herman, E., & Chomsky, N. (1988). Manufacturing consent: The political economy
o f the mass media. New York: Pantheon Books.
Herman, E., & Chomsky, N. (2002) Manufacturing consent: The political economy o f
the mass media. New York: Pantheon Books.
Holsti, O.R. (1969). Content analysis fo r the social sciences and humanities.
California: Addison-Wesley.

105

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Homig-Priest, S. (1996). Doing media research: An introduction. California: Sage.
Jackson, D. (1997a, November 3). He’s not crazy, he’s our neighbor; Ted
Kaczynski’s acquaintances insist he was normal. Time. Retrieved May 2001,
from InfoTrac database.
Jackson, D. (1997b, November 17). Man behind the mask: the accused Unabomber’s
lawyers say he’s schizophrenic, but can they use that as a defense? Time.
Retrieved May 2001, from InfoTrac database.
Jackson, D. (1998a, January 12). At his own request: is Kaczynski’s rejection of his
best chance for a defense a result of paranoid schizophrenia? Time. Retrieved
May 2001, from InfoTrac database.
Jackson, D. (1998b, January 19). In fits and starts: Kaczynski throws the Unabom
trial into disarray. Time. Retrieved May 2001, from InfoTrac database.
Johnston, D. (1995a, November 6). Bomber is called killer who is not on a political
mission. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Johnston, D. (1995b, May 2). F.B.I. issues alert for 2 more sought in bombing
inquiry. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Johnston, D. (1996, April 5). Long and twisting trail led to Unabom suspect’s arrest.
The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Justice in the Unabomber case. (1998, January 23). The New York Times. Retrieved
May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Kellner, D. (1990). Television and the crisis o f democracy. Boulder: Westview.

106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Kifner, J. (1995a, July 5). Bomb suspect felt at home riding the gun-show circuit.
The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Kifner, J. (1995b, August 13). Despite Oklahoma charges, the case is far from
closed. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Kifner, J. (1996, April 4). Among the junipers, a loner “not that remarkable.” The
New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Lacayo, R. (1996, April 22). A tale of two brothers. Time. Retrieved May 2001,
from InfoTrac database.
Lemonick, M. (1995, May 8). The bomb is in the mail. Time. Retrieved May 2001,
from InfoTrac database.
Long-running Unabom case continues to perplex the F.B.I. (1995, April 24). The
New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
McFadden, R. (1995a, May 4). John Doe no. 1— a special report; a life of solitude
and obsessions. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXISNEXIS database.
McFadden, R. (1995b, April 22). Links in blast: armed ‘militia’ and a key date. The
New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
McFadden, R. (1995c, June 30). Mail bomber links an end to killings to his
manifesto. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
McFadden, R. (1995d, April 23). One man’s complex path to extremism. The New
York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.

107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

McFadden, R. (1995e, July 4). Search intensifies in the Unabom case. The New York
Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
McFadden, R. (1995f, September 19). Times and The Washington Post grant mail
bomber’s demand. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXISNEXIS database.
McFadden, R. (1996, May 26). From a child of promise to the Unabom suspect. The
New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
McQuiston, J. (1996, June 22). Plot against R.I. leaders is tied to fear o f U.F.O.’s.
The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Merrill, J.C. (1983) Global journalism: A survey o f the world’s mass media. New
York: Longman.
Morrow, Lance. (1996, July 29). Natural evil, or man-made? Time. Retrieved May
2001, from InfoTrac database.
Mydans, S. (1995, June 30). Bomb hoax leaves Los Angeles airport with the jitters.
The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Myerson, A. (1997, March 3). With printing deadline far away, Dallas paper
scooped itself online. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from
LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Nachmias, C.F., & Nachmias, D. (1992). Research methods in the social sciences.
New York: St. M artin’s Press.
Noble, K. (1995a, August 8). F.B.I.’s search for serial bomber is unsettling for
radicals in Bay Area. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from
LEXIS-NEXIS database.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Noble, K. (1995b, April 25). Lobbyist is killed in letter bombing tied to 15 others.
The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Noble, K. (1995c, May 7). Prominent anarchist finds unsought ally in serial bomber.
The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Pfohl, S. (1977). The “discovery” of child abuse. Social Problems, 24, 310-323.
Professor asks bomber to forgo violence. (1995, July 5). The New York
Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Purdum, T. (1995, April 22). Bomb suspect is held, another identified; toll hits 65
as hope for survivors fades. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from
LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Reynolds, J. (1973). The medical institution. In L.T. Reynolds & J.M. Henslin
(Eds.), American society: A critical analysis. New York: David McKay.
Rich, Frank. (1995, April 27). New world terror. The New York Times. Retrieved
May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Rimer, S. (1995, May 28). With extremism and explosives, a drifting life found a
purpose. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Rossol, J. (2001). The medicalization of deviance as an interactive achievement: The
construction of compulsive gambling. Symbolic Interaction, 24, 315-341.
Sale, K. (1995, August 6). Toward a portrait of the Unabomber. The New York
Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Schmemann, S. (1995, April 24). New images of terror: extremists in heartland. The
New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.

109

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Schneider, J. (1978). Deviant drinking as disease: Alcoholism as a social
accomplishment.. Social Problems, 25, 361-372.
Steen, S. (2001). Contested portrayals: Medical and legal social control of juvenile
sex offenders. The Sociological Quarterly, 42,325-350.
Szasz, T. (1970). Ideology and insanity. New York: Doubleday
The militia threat. (1997, June 14). The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from
LEXIS-NEXIS database.
The Unabomber travesty. (1998, January 10). The New York Times. Retrieved May
2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database
Thomas, J. (1996, February 2). Bomb scars are visible at Oklahoma hearing. The
New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Thomas, J. (1997a, May 13). Friend says McVeigh wanted bombing to start an
“uprising.” The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Thomas, J. (1997b, June 3). McVeigh guilty on all counts in the Oklahoma City
bombing; Jury to weigh death penalty. The New York Times. Retrieved May
2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Thomas, J. (1997c, June 14). McVeigh jury decides on sentence of death in
Oklahoma bombing. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXISNEXIS database.
Thomas, J. (1997d, March 2). News article on bombing raises fears for fair trial. The
New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.

110

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Thomas, J. (1997d, June 11). Political ideas of McVeigh are subject at bomb trial.
The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Tiefer, L.(1994). The medicalization of impotence: Normalizing phallocentrism.
Gender and Society, 8, 363-377.
“U.S. News” names new editor. (2001, June 2). Retrieved from www.nvtimes.com
Verhovek, S. (1995, April 26). Many theories about choice of the target. The New
York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Verhovek, S. (1997, April 20). A look back and ahead at Oklahoma City site. The
New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Weiner, T. (1995a, July 6). Administration tries to blunt hearing on raid on Texas
sect. The New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS
database.
Weiner, T. (1995b, April 29). F.B.I. struggling to find answers in bombing case. The
New York Times. Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Williams, F., Rice, R.E., & Rogers, E.M. (1988) Research methods and the new
media. New York: Macmillan.
Wilson, J. (1998, January 15). In search of madness. The New York Times. Retrieved
May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.
Wrong step in the Unabom case. (1997, December 30). The New York Times.
Retrieved May 2001, from LEXIS-NEXIS database.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

